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Operating in the State of Idaho, 
R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFERY J. CRANDALL, 
Individually, and in their capacities 
as principals, managers, agents, 
partners, representatives as employees 
of OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC. 
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Fir icial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
User: BIELEC 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date 
5/6/2009 
5/29/2009 
6/1/2009 
6/5/2009 
7/10/2009 
7/16/2009 
9/1/2009 
9/16/2009 
10/22/2009 
10/26/2009 
11/2/2009 
11/9/2009 
11/25/2009 
Code 
SUMI 
NTSV 
NOAP 
ANSW 
SUMI 
HRSC 
HRVC 
NOTD 
NOTD 
NOTC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
HRSC 
AFFD 
MOTN 
NTSV 
NTSD 
HRVC 
NOTC 
User 
HUFFMAN 
LEU 
COCHRAN 
PARKER 
PARKER 
VICTORIN 
VICTORIN 
VICTORIN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
HARPER 
HARPER 
HARPER 
HARPER 
HARPER 
BOOTH 
HUFFMAN 
HUFFMAN 
Filing: A - Civil Complaint for more than 
$1,000.00 Paid by: JOSEPH JARZABEK 
Receipt number: 0846772 Dated: 5/6/2009 
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: 
Judge 
John P. Luster 
Summons Issued John P. Luster 
Notice Of Service--Patricia J Shelton--5/28/09 John P. Luster 
Filing: 17 - All Other Cases Paid by: Ramsden & John P. Luster 
Lyons Receipt number: 0850260 Dated: 
6/1/2009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Owens, 
R Bruce (defendant) 
Voluntary Appearance/ Michael Ramsden for John P. Luster 
Defendants 
Filing: J6 - Special motions, petitions and John P. Luster 
pleadings - Cross claim (defendant v. defendant 
or plaintiff v. plaintiff) Paid by: Ramsden & 
Lyons Receipt number: 0851220 Dated: 
6/5/2009 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For: Owens & 
Crandall PLLC (defendant) 
Answer, Third-Party Complaint and Demand for John P. Luster 
Jury Trial 
Third Party Summons Issued John P. Luster 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend John P. Luster 
07/23/2009 03:00 PM) 
Hearing result for Motion to Amend held on John P. Luster 
07/23/2009 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice Of Deposition/For Dennis E. Burks John P. Luster 
Notice Of Deposition/David R. skinner John P. Luster 
Notice VAcating Deposition DUCES TECUM of: John P. Luster 
David R. Skinner 10:00 AM 10/21/09 
Notice Vacating Deposition DUCES TECUM OF: John P. Luster 
Dennis E. Burks 9:00 AM 10/14/09 
Notice Vacating Deposition DUCES TECUM of: John P. Luster 
David R. Skinner 10:00 AM 10/21/09 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel 
11/30/2009 03:00 PM) 
Affidavit of Michael E Ramsden in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Motion to Compel 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs First Requests for John P. Luster 
Admission o& Requests for Production of 
BAXLEY 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
Documents to Defendants 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on 
11/30/2009 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Notice of withdrawal of motion to compel and 
vacation of hearing 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
John P. Luster 
Date: 12/15/2010 Firs icial District Court - Kootenai County User: BIELEC 
Time: 05:06 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 6 Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date Code User Judge 
12/2/2009 NTSV HUFFMAN Notice Of Service- First Requests for Admission John P. Luster 
& Request for Production of Documents to 
Defendant Served on Plaintiff 12/1 /09 
12/7/2009 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John P. Luster 
Judgment 03/04/2010 03:00 PM) 
2/1/2010 MNSJ BAXLEY Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
MEMS BAXLEY Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion John P. Luster 
For Summary Judgment 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Michael E Ramsden In Support of John P. Luster 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
NOHG BAXLEY Notice Of Hearing on 03/04/10 at 3:00 PM Re John P. Luster 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
2/18/2010 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John P. Luster 
Judgment 04/22/2010 03:00 PM) 
HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
held on 03/04/2010 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
2/22/2010 STIP SREED Stipulation to Vacate Defendants' Hearing on John P. Luster 
Their Motion for Summary Judgment 3/4/10 at 
3:00 p.m. and Reschedule the Same for 3:00 
p.m. 4/22./1 O at Kootenai County Courthouse 
3/10/2010 AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Lois M Bishop in Opposition to John P. Luster 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
3/17/2010 AFFD SREED Affidavit of Starr Kelso in Opposition to John P. Luster 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
FILE BAXLEY **************New File #2 Created************** John P. Luster 
AFFD BAXLEY Affidavit Of Lois M Bishop In Opposition To John P. Luster 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
3/18/2010 AFFD BAXLEY Supplemental Affidavit Of Starr Kelso In John P. Luster 
Opposition To Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
3/19/2010 AFFD BAXLEY Affidavit of Joseph Jarzabek John P. Luster 
NOHG BAXLEY Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing On Her Motion For John P. Luster 
Summary Judgment on 04/22/10 at 3:00 pm 
MNSJ BAXLEY Motion For Partial Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
MEMO BAXLEY Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' John P. Luster 
Motion For Summary Judgment And In Support 
Of Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD BAXLEY Affidavit of David R Skinner In Opposition To John P. Luster 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
4/8/2010 AFFD COCHRAN Affidavit of R Bruce Owens in Opposition to John P. Luster 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD COCHRAN Affidavit of Michael J Verbillis in Opposition to John P. Luster 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO COCHRAN Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion John P. Luster 
for Summary Judgment 
Date: 12/15/2010 
Time: 05:06 PM 
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Fir icial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
User: BIELEC 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date 
4/8/2010 
4/14/2010 
4/15/2010 
4/19/2010 
4/21/2010 
4/22/2010 
5/6/2010 
Code 
OBJT 
OBJT 
AFFD 
MOTN 
FILE 
MEMS 
MEMO 
AFSV 
AFSV 
MEMO 
DCHH 
HRSC 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
NOHG 
User 
COCHRAN 
COCHRAN 
COCHRAN 
COCHRAN 
HARWOOD 
BAXLEY 
BAXLEY 
BAXLEY 
BAXLEY 
HUFFMAN 
BOOTH 
BOOTH 
HUFFMAN 
HUFFMAN 
HUFFMAN 
HUFFMAN 
Judge 
Objections to Affidavit of David R Skinner in John P. Luster 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Objections to Affidavit of Lois M Bishop in John P. Luster 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Joseph Jarzabek in Support of John P. Luster 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine; Objections to Affidavit 
of Michael J Verbillis; Objections to Affidavit of R 
Bruce Owens' Motions to Strike 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine; Objections to Affidavit John P. Luster 
of Michael J Verbillis; Objections to Affidavit of R 
Bruce Owens; Motion to Strike 
******************FILE #3 
CREA TED******************* 
John P. Luster 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum In Support Of John P. Luster 
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment 
Reply To Defendants' Memorandum In John P. Luster 
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit Of Service on 06/10/09 served Idaho John P. Luster 
State Insurance Fund by leaving with Steve 
Strack 
Affidavit Of Service on 06/10/09 served Idaho John P. Luster 
State Insurance Fund by leaving with Ronald D 
Coston Legal Counsel 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in John P. Luster 
Limine; Objections to Affidavit of Michael J 
Verbillis; Objections to Affidavit of R. Bruce 
Owens; Motions to Strike 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
held on 04/22/2010 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John P. Luster 
Judgment 07/13/2010 03:00 PM) set by Mike 
Ramsden 
Affidavit of Michael E Ramsden In Support of John P. Luster 
Defendants' Second Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Defendants' Second Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
John P. Luster 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second John P. Luster 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Date: 12/15/2010 icial District Court - Kootenai County User: BIELEC 
Time: 05:06 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of6 Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date Code User Judge 
5/10/2010 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/16/2010 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM} to substitute PR - set by Jarzabek 
MOTN VICTORIN Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Lois M Bishop as John P. Luster 
Personal Representative of Patricia Shelton 
NOHG CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Notice Of Hearing on motion to John P. Luster 
Substitute Lois M Bishop as Personal 
Representative of Patricia J Shelton 
5/13/2010 ORDR BOOTH Order on Defendants' Motion for summary John P. Luster 
judgment 
5/18/2010 FILE HARWOOD ************EXPANDO CREATED FILE John P. Luster 
#-4************ 
6/4/2010 CONT BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 06/16/2010 John P. Luster 
03:00 PM: Continued to substitute PR - set by 
Jarzabek 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/22/2010 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM) 
6/7/2010 HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 06/22/2010 John P. Luster 
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
6/8/2010 NOHG SHANKLIN Plaintiff's Amended Notice Of Hearing on Motion John P. Luster 
to Substitute Lois M Bishop As Personal 
Representative of Patricia J Shelton 
6/10/2010 ORDR BUTLER Memorandum Opinion and Order in Re: Plaintiff's John P. Luster 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Granted 
in Part Denied in Part 
6/28/2010 MISC SHEDLOCK Plaintiff's Response To Defendants' Second John P. Luster 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
7/6/2010 MEMO CRUMPACKER Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendatns John P. Luster 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
OBJT CRUMPACKER Defendants Opposittion to Plaintiffs Motion to John P. Luster 
Substitute Lois M Bishop as Personal 
Representative of Patricia J Shelton 
7/13/2010 DCHH BUTLER Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
held on 07/13/2010 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: ANNE MCMANUS 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: set by Mike Ramsden + Motion to 
substitute PR- MATTERS TAKEN UNDER 
ADVISEMENT 
7/21/2010 MEMO BOOTH Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Defendants John P. Luster 
second Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Personal 
Representative 
7/22/2010 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/11/2010 03:00 John P. Luster 
PM} for permissive appeal 
7/23/2010 MOTN CRUMPACKER Motion for Appeal by Permission John P. Luster 
NOHG CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
Date: 12/15/2010 
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r;'"':1:t"'~", 
icial District Court - Kootenai Countyt · 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
User: BIELEC 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date Code User Judge 
7/26/2010 NTSV CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service John P. Luster 
8/9/2010 AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Dennis Burks John P. Luster 
8/10/2010 NTSV BAXLEY Notice Of Service John P. Luster 
8/11/2010 DCHH BOOTH Hearing result for Motion held on 08/11/2010 John P. Luster 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anne MacManus 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: for permissive appeal under100 
pages 
8/12/2010 ORDR BOOTH Order denying motion for appeal by permission John P. Luster 
9/1/2010 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John P. Luster 
Judgment 12/02/2010 03:00 PM) 
9/2/2010 MEMO VICTORIN Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Second John P. Luster 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MNSJ VICTORIN Plaintiff's Second Motion For Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
NOHG VICTORIN Plaintiff's Notice Of Hearing on Her Second John P. Luster 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
9/9/2010 NTSV ROSEN BUSCH Notice Of Service John P. Luster 
NTSV ROSENBUSCH Notice Of Service John P. Luster 
10/12/2010 HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel John P. Luster 
11/02/2010 03:00 PM) 
10/14/2010 MNCL CRUMPACKER Motion To Compel John P. Luster 
AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Theron J De Smet in Support of John P. Luster 
Defendants & Third Party Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel 
NOHG CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing John P. Luster 
10/25/2010 ORDR RICKARD Order Granting Motion For Appeal By Permission John P. Luster 
10/28/2010 NTSV ROSEN BUSCH Notice Of Service of Responses to John P. Luster 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to 
Plaintiff Lois M. Bishop 
10/29/2010 HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on John P. Luster 
11/02/2010 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
HRSC BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel John P. Luster 
11/03/2010 09:00 AM) HEARING RESET FROM 
11/2/10 TO ACCOMMODATE COURT 
SCHEDULE 
BOOTH Notice of Hearing John P. Luster 
11/1/2010 HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on John P. Luster 
11/03/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HEARING RESET FROM 11/2/10 TO 
ACCOMMODATE COURT SCHEDULE 
Date: 12/15/2010 
Time: 05:06 PM 
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Fir icial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0003597 Current Judge: John P. Luster 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, etal. 
User: BIELEC 
Patricia J Shelton vs. R Bruce Owens, Jane Doe Owens, Owens & Crandall PLLC, Jeffrey J Crandall 
Date Code User Judge 
11/8/2010 CLEVELAND Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal John P. Luster 
to Supreme Court Paid by: Ramsden, Michael 
E. (attorney for Owens & Crandall PLLC) Receipt 
number: 0048216 Dated: 11/8/2010 Amount: 
$101.00 (Check) For: Owens & Crandall PLLC 
(defendant), Owens, Jane Doe (defendant) and 
Owens, R Bruce (defendant) 
NOTC HUFFMAN Notice Of Appeal John P. Luster 
11/9/2010 APDC HUFFMAN Appeal Filed In District Court John P. Luster 
APMD HUFFMAN Appeal Filed To Supreme Court John P. Luster 
BNDC LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 48513 Dated John P. Luster 
11/9/2010 for 100.00) 
11/19/2010 MISC LEU Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs Second John P. Luster 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
NOTC RICKARD Notice Of Transcript Lodge John P. Luster 
11/23/2010 HRVC BOOTH Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John P. Luster 
held on 12/02/2010 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
12/2/2010 MOTN HUFFMAN Motion to Vacate Plaintiffs Hearing On Her John P. Luster 
Second Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Joseph Jarzabek 
ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON 
MARKS & ELLIOTT, Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
102 S. Euclid Avenue, Suite 307 
P.O. Box 1049 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-8517; Telephone 
(208) 263-0759; Facsimile 
Idaho State Bar No. 2678 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an ) 
individual; ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
R. BRUCE OWENS AND JANE DOE ) 
OWENS, husband and wife and ) 
the marital community composed) 
thereof; OWENS & CRANDALL, ) 
PLLC, a limited liability ) 
company operating in the State) 
of Idaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and ) 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, ) 
individually, and in their ) 
capacities as principals, ) 
managers, agents, partners, ) 
representatives and employees ) 
of OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC.; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
0 9 Js-- 01··1 Case No. CV- ' I -
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Fee Category Al 
Filing Fee: $88 
-1-
OR\G\NAL,~~-
COMES NOW, the above-named plaintiff, by and through her 
attorney of record, Joseph Jarzabek, and hereby alleges and 
states as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. At all times material hereto Plaintiff Patricia 
Shelton was a resident of the State of Idaho and now resides in 
Utah. 
2. At all times material hereto Defendants, R. BRUCE 
OWENS and JANE DOE OWENS were residents of the State of Idaho 
residing in Kootenai County. 
3. At all times material hereto Defendant OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, was a law firm operating in the State of Idaho. 
4. At all times material hereto defendants R. BRUCE OWENS 
and JEFFREY J. CRANDALL were licensed attorneys in the State of 
Idaho and managers, agents and/or employees of the law firm OWENS 
& CRANDALL, PLLC, residing and practicing law in the State of 
Idaho. OWENS advertises he is a Civil Trial Specialist. 
5. On February 3, 1997 SHELTON was injured in an 
automobile accident which left her permanently, totally disabled 
and unable to care for herself. She suffered a C6-C7-Tl spinal 
injury resulting in tetrapelgia. SHELTON is a quadriplegic. At 
the time of her injury she was working so Idaho State Insurance 
Fund, the workman compensation surety, commenced payment of 
benefits, including medical expense payments. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -2-
6. On or about September 21, 2006 SHELTON was admitted to 
a care facility in Post Falls, Idaho for treatment. The care 
and/or lack of care provided at this facility resulted in further 
injury to SHELTON. SHELTON retained R. BRUCE OWENS and the law 
firm of OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, to represent her on her medical 
malpractice claim against the facility and the providers who had 
acted negligently. She signed a fee agreement required by R. 
BRUCE OWENS wherein she agreed to pay him and his law firm 40% of 
any amounts recovered by her. SHELTON relied on the expertise 
of OWEN and his representation that he was a Civil Trial 
Specialist when making decisions required of her during the 
pendency of her malpractice claim. 
7. A mediation on SHELTON's medical malpractice claim 
took place in Seattle, Washington September 10, 2008. Prior to 
the mediation OWENS sent to the mediator, Gregory L. Burtram, a 
Mediation Statement. In the statement OWENS related SHELTON'S 
medical expense had increased an average of seven hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) per year because of the 
malpractice of the care providers and the facility. He stated 
her additional medical expense would be at least four million 
dollars ($4,000,0000.00) during her remaining lifetime as a 
result of the malpractice. He requested the facility and care 
providers pay SHELTON five million dollars ($5,000,000.00) to 
settle her claim. On or about February 6, 2009 SHELTON, relying 
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on the advice and experience of OWENS, Civil Trial Specialist, 
signed a "Full Release and Settlement Agreement" which settled 
her medical malpractice claim. A copy of the of the release with 
her signature is labeled Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Prior to 
signing this agreement OWENS had told SHELTON the subrogation 
claim of Idaho State Insurance Fund was taken care of. She 
relied on his advice and representation in making her decision to 
settle her claim. 
8. At all times material hereto Idaho State Insurance 
Fund had a right to be reimbursed by SHELTON for all monies it 
had paid her for her medical care and any other benefits related 
to the malpractice. This right of subrogation is created by 
Idaho Code§ 72-223. By law Idaho State Insurance Fund is 
entitled to be reimbursed not only for past expense it was 
obligated to pay but also for future expense it is obligated to 
pay out of any money received by SHELTON from her settlement 
after OWENS and his law firm were paid their attorney fees and 
reimbursed for any costs they had advanced on her behalf. 
9. On March 6, 2009 David R. Skinner, an attorney for 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, sent correspondence to OWENS 
notifying him State Insurance Fund would not waive its 
subrogation claim against SHELTON and wanted to be reimbursed. 
On March 16, 2009 OWENS sent a letter to Idaho State Insurance 
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Fund requesting they tell him the amount of their subrogation 
claim. A copy of that correspondence is labeled Exhibit "B", 
attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein as if 
set forth in full. This letter was sent over a month after OWENS 
had advised SHELTON to settle her claim and had told her the 
subrogation claim of Idaho State Insurance Fund was not an issue. 
As of March 16, 2009 neither OWENS nor his law firm knew how much 
SHELTON had to pay State Insurance Fund. 
11. On April 7, 2009 attorney David R. Skinner, acting on 
behalf of Idaho State Insurance Fund, wrote OWENS and informed 
him State Insurance Fund had paid a total of three million eight 
hundred and thirty eight thousand five hundred and fifteen 
dollars and ninety-six cents ($3,838,515.96) in medical benefits. 
On April 9, 2009 OWENS sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel 
relating he and his firm had received from SHELTON four hundred 
sixty thousand dollars ($460,000.00) for attorney fees and 
twenty-five thousand four hundred and fifty-six dollars and 
forty-six cents ($25,456.46) for costs it had advanced. He 
stated there was six hundred and sixty-four thousand, five 
hundred and forty-three dollars and fifty-four cents 
($664,543.54) left for SHELTON that he had placed in an account. 
SHELTON has no access to this account. She does not know where 
the account is. She has no account number. SHELTON never 
authorized OWENS to disburse any settlement funds. OWENS has 
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never provided SHELTON an accounting of costs. 
12. Defendants have been paid their attorney fees and 
costs in the amount of four hundred eighty-five thousand, four 
hundred fifty-six dollars and forty-six cents ($485,456.46). As 
of the date of filing this Complaint, May 4, 2009, SHELTON has 
received no money. Idaho State Insurance Fund has claimed it is 
entitled to her entire recovery amount. 
13. On April 30, 2009 Idaho State Insurance Fund sent a 
letter to SHELTON's counsel. They claimed they were entitled to 
the all the recovery. A copy of that correspondence is labeled 
Exhibit "Cu, attached hereto and by this reference incorporated 
herein as if set forth in full. Idaho Code§ 72-223 allows 
Idaho State Insurance Fund to make this claim. 
14. Prior to settlement of her medical malpractice claim 
OWENS never informed SHELTON Idaho State Insurance Fund could 
terminate and/or reduce payment of compensation benefits to her 
if she settled her malpractice claim. If he had done so and 
obtained a sum certain from Idaho State Insurance Fund for 
settlement of their subrogation claim this lawsuit would not be 
necessary. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
NEGLIGENCE 
Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-14 above as if fully set 
forth herein. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -6-
C6 
15. Defendants, and each of them, owed Plaintiff a duty 
to inform her of the law in the State of Idaho as it related to 
not only her malpractice claim but as it related to the 
subrogation claims of Idaho State Insurance Fund which could be 
asserted against any recovery she obtained under Idaho Code§ 72-
223. OWENS failed to obtain from Idaho State Insurance Fund a 
sum certain that could be paid them to settle their claim of 
subrogation. Defendants should have obtained for Claimant a 
partial lump sum agreement approved by the Idaho Industrial 
Commission, the adjudicating body for workman compensation claims 
in the State of Idaho, setting forth the amount due Idaho State 
Insurance Fund upon settlement of her malpractice claim. The 
lump sum agreement and Order of the Idaho Industrial Commission 
would have constituted a full and final resolution of the claim 
by Idaho State Insurance Fund. Knowing the exact amount Idaho 
State Insurance had to be paid would have allowed SHELTON to make 
an informed decision on whether or not to settle her malpractice 
claim. On February 6, 2009 SHELTON had no knowledge of the 
amount that was claimed due by Idaho State Insurance Fund. She 
had no knowledge of that amount because of the negligence of 
Defendants. OWENS failed to obtain from Idaho State Insurance 
Fund a sum certain thus depriving Plaintiff SHELTON of the 
ability to make an informed decision on whether or not to settle 
her malpractice claim. 
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16. Defendants knew or should have known Idaho State 
Insurance Fund would claim entitlement to an offset and/or 
termination of benefits until an amount equal to all amounts 
recovered by SHELTON, after deduction of their attorney fees and 
reimbursement of costs they had advanced, had been used up on 
payment of medical expense. If Defendants had told SHELTON at 
mediation that she would receive nothing from the settlement and 
the only payment made would be to OWENS for attorney fees and 
costs and to Idaho State Insurance Fund for reimbursement of 
medical expense it had paid for her, she would not have settled 
her malpractice claim. SHELTON gained nothing from the 
settlement. All the settlement did is allow Idaho State 
Insurance Fund to terminate payment of benefits to her until the 
subrogation issue is decided by the Industrial Commission. 
SHELTON thought she was going to receive six hundred and sixty-
four thousand, five hundred and forty-three dollars and fifty-
four cents ($664,543.54); so far she has received nothing and has 
been required to incur additional attorney fees and costs in 
preparation for the hearing scheduled by the Industrial 
Commission June 17, 2009. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Plaintiff realleges paragaraphs 1-17 above as if fully set 
forth herein. 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -8-
r::g 
,,, 
18. SHELTON had a contract with Defendants. The contract 
required Defendants to use their best efforts to obtain recovery 
for SHELTON on her medical malpractice claim. The contract 
required Defendants to adequately inform SHELTON about Idaho law 
as it related to her malpractice claim and the subrogation claim 
asserted by Idaho State Insurance Fund under Idaho Code§ 72-223. 
Defendants breached their contract. They failed to properly 
advise SHELTON. She relied on their representations at mediation 
that the subrogation issue had been dealt with. She relied on 
their representations prior, during and following the mediation 
hearing on decisions she made relating to her malpractice claim. 
Defendants breached their contract with her when they advised her 
to sign the release February 2, 2009. They represented to 
SHELTON she would receive six hundred and sixty-four thousand, 
five hundred and forty-three dollars and fifty-four cents 
($664,543.54); as a result of their breach she received nothing 
and her workman compensation benefits have been terminated. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray as follow: 
1. Under Plaintiff's first cause of action for judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff for general and special damages against 
Defendants in an amount within the jurisdiction of this Court to 
be proven at trial. 
2. Under Plaintiff's second cause of action for judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff for general and special damages against 
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Defendants in an amount within the jurisdiction of this Court to 
be proven at trial. 
3. For an award to Plaintiffs of their attorney fees and 
costs incurred in prosecution of their claims as allowed by rule 
and statute. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
FURTHER, Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues 
contained herein. 
DATED this 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND 
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day of 
( 
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' ~ ~ ~ !L RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
L Release 
For the consideration of ONE MlLLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND 00/100 
Dollars ($1,150,000.00), I forever release·. 
·, and their 
attorneys, agents, employees, subsidiaries and assigns, any and all other persons and entities for 
whose conduct they may be liable or for whom they may be contractually obligated to provide 
professional liability insurance coverage (11Parties Released"), from all claims and causes of 
action, which may ever be asserted by the unders,gne~, her executors, administrators, successors, 
~gos, or others, whether such claim..q or causes of action are presently known o( unknown., 
wruch in any way arise out of the facts stated in the Complaint fl.led in 
, or which in any way· involve the diagnosis, care and treatment, or the 
failure to diagnose or treat, PA TRJCIA J. SHEL TON during her admissions es a patient at 
in the years 2006 and 2007, or at any time to the 
prc:scnt. 
This Full Release and Settlement Agreement (hereinafter referred tO as "Agreement") is 
intended to cover any and alt future injuries, damages or losses not known to the parties lo this 
Agreement, but which may later develop, or be discovered in connection with the above-
referenced diagnosis, care and treatmen~ or failure to diagnose or treat, including_ bl.it not limited 
to, wrongful death claims or loss of consortium claims and shall be binding on our actual or any 
possible heirs, cx.ocurors, administrators, and assigns. 
The undersigned acknowledges that she has accepted the above-referenced considet.alion 
a.s compensation for any and all injuries, damages and losses (past, present and future, known and 
unknown), which were or c.ould ever be claimed in connection with the above-referenced 
diagnosis, care and treatment, or fai(ure to diagnose or treat, including but not limited to, 
wrongful death claims.or loss of.consortium claims and-shall be binding on-our actual or any 
possible heirs, executors, administr.ators, and a_ssigns. 
EXHIBIT 
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The undersigned warrants that no prnmise or indu ment has been offered except as 
herein set forth and that this Agreement is exc=cuted witho t reliance upon any statement or 
representation by the Parties Released or their representati es concerning the nature and extent of 
the injuries, and/or damages, and/or kgal liability therefor 
2. Inden:m\f.ication for Subrogation and Uen Claims 
The undersigned acknowledges that all subrogatio and lien claims arising out of contract 
or under state or federal law, including but not limited to, y subrogation or: lien claims of 
Patricia Shelton's health care providers, insurance carriers the Department of Social and Health 
Services and any federal or state agency ot programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, Veteran's. 
Administration, Workmen's Compensation Program and/or the Idaho State Insurance Fund, are 
the sole and separate obligation of the undersigned which the undersigned agrees to pay or 
otherwise resolve. 
The undersigned further hefCby covenants to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the 
Parties Released, and their attorneys, agents and assigns from and against any further claims 
arising from or related to the health care provided, including all such lien and subr:ogetion claims. 
' ' 
This hold harmless provision includes the costs and attorney's fees incurred in the defense of 
such claims. The Released Parties retain the right to monitor the defense of any such claim or 
action. 
3. Waqanty of Capacity to Execute Agreement 
The undersigned warrants that no other person or entity has or has had any interest in the 
claims or causes ~faction referred to in this Release and Settlement Agreement and that the 
undersigned has.the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Release and Settlement 
Agreement and receive the sums specified in it. The undersigned shall defend and indemnify the 
Parties Released should any other per:.son claim to have an intc'rest in the claims and injuries 
described in this Release and Settlement Agreement. 
4. Confidentiality 
As part of.the consideration for the sums payable under this Agreement, the undersigned · 
agree tha1 neither she nor her attorneys, agents, assignees, or successors shall reveal to or discuss 
2 . RELEASE IIND SETTl.r:.MF.ITT I\GREeMEt-IT 
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with anyone, including the media, other than as may be agreed to in writing by the Parties 
Releascd.,or as may be r:equired by law, the nam.es or identities of the Parties Released by, the 
sums payable under, or any of the other terms or conditions of this Agreement, except that the 
undersigned may disclose such information to immediate family members or, to the extent 
reasonably necessary, to persons providing legal, financial, or counseling services to the 
undersigned provided that any family member or person to whom such information is disclosed 
is instructed and agrees not to publish or further disclose information, but plaintiff may 
communicate the amount of and fact's of this settlement to her medical insurers. 
5. Govemiu.g Law 
This Release and Settlement Agreement shall be construed and inteiprctcd according to 
the laws of the state ofidaho. 
6. Derual of Liability 
This Agreement expresses the full and complete settlement of all liability claims. 
Liability for such claims is expressly denied by the Parties Released. Regardless of the adequacy 
of the above consideration, the acceptance of this release shall not operate as an admission of 
liability on the part of the Parties Released. 
I HA VE COMPLETELY READ THIS FINAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT AND FULLY UNDERSTAND AND VOLUNTARILY ACCEPT IT FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF FTNAL RESOLUTION AND SETTLEMENT OF ANY AND ALL CLAIMS . 
DISPUTED OR OTHER\VISE, AND FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF PRECLUDING 
FOREVER ANY OTHER CLAIMS ARJSING OUT OF OR IN ANYWAY CONNECTED 
WITH THE INCIDENTS, INnJRIES, OR DAMAGES ABOVE MENTIONED. 
I RECOGNIZE THAT THE FUTURE COURSE OF PRESENT INJURY OR OTHER 
DAMAGES CANNOT BE PREDICTED WITH CERTAINTY. I ASSUME THE RISK THAT 
THE. CLAIMED INJURIES OR DAMAGES MAY WORSEN IN THE FITTURE AND THAT 
NEW IN.TlJRJES OR DAMAGES MAY .DEVELOP. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MY 
INFORMATION REGARDING CLAIMS MADE rs SUFFICIENT TO ENTER INTO THIS 
3 . ru;.r,E.11.SC /\NO SETTLEMENT AOREl:MENT 
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RELEASE ANO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY CLAIM 
THAT THIS RELEASE IS NOT FAIRLY AND KNOwrNGL Y MADE. 
DA TED this ~ day of February, 2009. 
;~~G PATRifr°~u-:u-.....-------
STATE OF UTAH 
County of __Q:j:U/ S 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On this day pel'sonally appeared before me.PATRlCIA J. SHELTON to me known to be 
the individual described in and who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged that she signed the saine as her free and voluntary act and deed, for the uses and 
purposes therdn mentioned. 
GIVEN under my hand and official seal this ~ day of February, 2009. 
4 • REUA.SE AND SETTLF.MENT AGRF.EM:F.r>TT 
~~0/1'\oOO 
NOiiruBLIC in and for the State 
of Utah, residing at 1--.......__-V\ ~. lTT a.Ji 
My commission expires: 3 '2..Cf '2.ol 1...-
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The undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, in cormection with the matters and things set forth· 
in the foregoing Release and Settlement Agreement, hereby: 
1. Guarantees th.at the signature to this Agreement is the signature of the Plaintiff in 
this lawsuit and the individual named in the Agreement; 
2. Agrees, as pa.rt of the consideration for the settlement of this matter and the 
inclusion of the plaintiff's attorney as payee on the settlement draft, to pay out of the settlement 
proceeds or otherwise resolve all known subrogation claims and liens in conjunction with the 
claimed injuries and damages such that the Parties Released shal I have no liability for such 
known subrogation or lien claims. 
3. Agrees, as part of the consideration for the settlement of this action and the 
inclusion of the Plaintiff's attorney as payee on the settlement draft, to be bound by the terms.,in 
paragraph 4 of this Agreement(relating to confidentiality) as though she had signed this 
Agreement as a releasing a~emnifying party. 
DA TED this~ day of February, 2009. · 
Check 
One 
lndiVidual 
Part11crship 
Sole Propric1or 
Corporallon 
XX P.LLC 
Owens & Crandall. PLLC 
_L__ 
R. Bruce Owens 
Name OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC 
Tax Identification Number 2.0-4781760 
--------------
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OWENS & CRANDALL 
Slate 1nsurar,ce Fund 
P. 0. Box: 83720 
Boise 1D 83720-004"-1 
Faxed: 208--33~-24-33 
t\ttention. Tr.rcsa Raymoo.d 
.Re: 
Dear 1'r:resa: 
Patricia Shr,lLon 
Claim No. 9702259 
March 16, 2009 
: s5,) ~ l"kcwocd l;u,·.: S,:. !O~ 
C.~c,:~ d',\Jto.:. ld,uw ~;,.'ll, 
Phon, (~O~,J6:.M98~ 
:'/ll< :208) ,;{,~ · 10.39 
Vt."\V\V (iw1:'.'ill:)Hci.tll C.(J'"\"\ 
I have been caJlin.g you J~ow for a?proxi.matcly three weeks in ordc.r w dctcnninr: 
the subroga.ted interest that the State Insurance Fund is seeking with regard lo thi~ 
matttt. As you i:-ecall, during the mediation last September, you were contacted by the 
mediator, Gregory L. Bertram, and you advjs,s_d ·him that the State Insurance F\.:.nd 
would ~-ettle on their 3Ubrogation o( $62.000 less a pro rata share of fees and easer-. 
That i~ the .ligurc i;hat ~ relied u_pon i::i. o-ur negotiatior1~ with the carrier in fmally 
getting tbi,'> matter resolved la!!t monc\-l 
We have had the settlement proceeds in our :rust account for three weeks and I 
don't think it is ethicaJ for me LO withhold them any longer, l thin.k my cbent is 
en1itled to her proceeds less the subrogated claim by the State Insoranc(·; F'u.nd. For 
that reason. I have been io cont.act with you to try and determine what that amount is. 
I dun't think. I can v.,ithhold the~c funds any longer for my client, in good faith, -and 
therefore ·insist that t.hc State Insurance Fund provide me that number or~ or before 
Wedr.l'!sday. March 18. 1t is my inrcnt to send Patricia her share. o[ ·the proceeds from 
the !lettlcmeot on the.t dale whether J have heard from the Stare lnsuranc::e l"und or 
not. 
Please contact rne a.-s soon as pos3iblc ,o that we can get thi:; matte:,· 1c5olvcd. 
irs cru!y, 
R. Bruce Owens 
------RBO:jo 
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DAVID RUPERT SKINNER 
Attorney At Law 
drupertskinner@ao I. com 
6098 Tonkin Drive Boise, Idaho 83704 Phone 208-376-1911 
April 30, 2009 
R . Bruce Owens (bruce@cdalawyer.com) 
Owens & Cranda11, PLLC 
1859 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 104 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Re: Patricia J. Shelton, Claimant vs. Auto Phone Corporation, Employer, and 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety. 
LC. No. 1997-005067 
Dear Mr. Owens, 
This letter is in response to your letter to Teresa Raymond dated March 16, 2009, 
written approximately two weeks after you settled the medical malpractice case on behalf 
of Patricia Shelton. In that letter you requested that the State Insurance Fund provide you 
with the amount of its subrogated claim. The subrogation claim of the State Insurance 
Fund for medical benefits paid to date> and for future medical benefits resulting from the 
medical malpractice, exceeds the total amount of $1,150,000 that you received in the 
settlement. That was the total before you deducted your attorney's fee of $460,000 and 
approximately $25,000 for costs. Therefore the State Insurance Fund requests that you 
immediately tender the amount of $1,150,000 less our pro rata share of reasonable 
attorney fees and costs. It is my understanding that Richard Whitehead is representing 
your interests on the reasonableness of your attorney fee so I have f01warded a copy of 
this letter to him. The State Insurance Fund will begin offsetting the payment of benefits 
on behalf of Patricia Shelton against the amoW1t of the settlement beginning on May 10, 
2009. 
Sincerely, 
David R. Skinner 
Attorney at Law 
cc : Richard Whitehead 
Joseph Jarzabek 
Sent by email on April 30, 2009 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
SUMMONS ISSUED 
JUN O 5 2009 
· STATE OF IDAMO ' f'" 
COUtHY OF KOOTENAIJ .i;, 
FILED: 
2UU9 JUN -5 PM 4: 15 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF:THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. BRUCE OWENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, a 
limited liability company operating in the 
State ofldaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
and employees of OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Third party plaintiff, 
vs. 
IDAHO ST ATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Third party Defendant. 
9 
Case No. CV 09-3~7 
ANSWER, THIRD-PARTY 
COM:PLAINTANDDEMANDFOR 
JURYTRIAL 
Fee Category: J 6(b) 
Fee: $14.00 
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COME NOW the above-captioned defendants and answer the complaint as follows: 
1. As to paragraph 1 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
2. As to paragraph 2 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
3. As to paragraph 3 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
4. As to paragraph 4 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
5. As to paragraph 5 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
6. As to paragraph 6 of the complaint, defendants admit. 
7. As to paragraph 7 of the complaint, defendants admit that a mediation was held 
m the underlying matter on September 10, 2008 and thereafter concluding on or about 
February 6, 2009. Admit that the plaintiff executed a release, a redacted copy of which is 
attached to the complaint. Admit that prior to the plaintiff's signature on the release, the 
defendants had reached an agreement with the Idaho State Insurance Fund to compromise its 
subrogated interest in the proceeds of the settlement of the underlying matter for $62,500 less 
the attorney fees and costs incurred by defendants in obtaining the settlement. Defendants 
deny the remainder of the allegations in this paragraph. 
8. As to paragraph 8 of the complaint, it constitutes a statement or conclusion of 
law and defendants neither admit nor deny. 
9. As to paragraph 9 of the complaint, admit that on March 16, 2009 the 
defendants sent the letter to the Idaho State Insurance Fund attached to the complaint as 
Exhibit B. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in this paragraph. 
10. There is no paragraph 10 of the complaint, and therefore defendants neither 
admit nor deny any omitted allegation. 
11. As to paragraph 11 of the complaint, admit that correspondence was 
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exchanged between defendants and the Idaho State Insurance Fund, through counsel, the 
contents of which speak for themselves. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in 
this paragraph. 
12. As to paragraph 12 of the complaint, defendants admit that they have received 
their attorney fees from the settlement proceeds of the settlement of the underlying matter. 
Defendants admit that the Idaho State Insurance Fund has asserted a claim to the entire 
settlement proceeds of the settlement of the underlying matter, including the defendants' 
attorney fees. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in this paragraph. 
13. As to paragraph 13 of the complaint, defendants admit that on April 30, 2009 
the Idaho State Insurance Fund through counsel sent a letter to the defendants attached to the 
complaint as Exhibit C. Defendants deny the remainder of the allegations in this paragraph. 
14. As to paragraph 14 of the complaint, the statements contained therein are 
argument and not a short and plain statement of the facts, showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to relief, and defendants therefore neither admit nor deny. 
15. As to paragraph 15 of the complaint, the statements contained therein are 
argument and not a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to relief. Nonetheless, the defendants deny the statements in this paragraph. 
16. As to paragraph 16 of the complaint, the statements contained therein are 
argument and not a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to relief. Nonetheless, the defendants deny the statements in this paragraph. 
17. As to paragraph 17 of the complaint, the statements contained therein are 
argument and not a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to relief. Nonetheless, the defendants deny the statements in this paragraph .... 
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18. Defendants deny plaintiff's prayer for relief. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's losses, if any, are solely due to the negligent, willful and tortious 
misconduct of the Idaho State Insurance Fund, conduct whi~h the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
is estopped to deny. 
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Owens & Crandall, PLLC for a third party complaint against the Idaho 
State Insurance Fund and claims and alleges as follows: 
1. Third party plaintiff, Owens & Crandall, PLLC (Owens & Crandall) is a 
professional limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of Idaho, with its 
principal place of business located at Hayden, Idaho. 
2. Third party defendant Idaho State Insurance Fund is an independent body 
corporate politic organized and existing under the laws of Idaho, with its principal place of 
business at Boise, Idaho. 
3. Plaintiff Patricia J. Shelton (Shelton) is the former client of Owens & Crandall, 
PLLC. R. Bruce Owens of Owens & Crandall represented Shelton in that certain action 
entitled Shelton v. Ernest Health, Inc., Kootenai County Case No. CV-08-00405 (the medical 
malpractice action). Shelton is also the claimant in that certain proceeding entitled Shelton v. 
Auto Phone, Inc. and Idaho State Insurance Fund, before the Idaho Industrial Commission, 
Case No. LC. No. 97-005067 (the worker's compensation action). 
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4. On September 10, 2008 a mediation was held in the medical malpractice action. 
The Idaho State Insurance Fund received notification of the mediation on August 26, 2007 
and participated telephonically in the mediation by and through its authorized representative 
Teresa Raymond, Senior Claims Representative. 
5. At the mediation, the Idaho State Insurance Fund agreed to acquit and compromise 
its subrogated interest, if any, to the settlement proceeds of the medical malpractice action for 
the sum of $62,500, less a proportionate share of the attorney fees and costs incurred by 
Owens & Crandall in obtaining the settlement. All parties to the medical malpractice action 
relied upon this representation in conducting the mediation on September 10, 2008 and 
thereafter. 
6. A full and complete settlement of the medical malpractice action was achieved on 
February 6, 2009. Owens & Crandall currently holds proceeds from this settlement, net of its 
attorney fees and costs, in its trust account. 
7. Subsequent to the settlement of the medical malpractice action, the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund at first refused to communicate with Owens & Crandall to confirm its 
agreement to compromise its subrogated interest for $62,500 less a proportionate share of the 
attorney fees and costs insured by Owens & Crandall in obtaining the settlement. Then on 
April 30, 2009, the Idaho State Insurance Fund repudiated its previous position and claimed 
the entirety of the settlement amount of the medical malpractice action, less a proportionate 
share of the attorney fees and costs incurred by Owens & Crandall in obtaining the settlement. 
8. Shelton has filed a complaint against Owens & Crandall for legal malpractice and 
breach of contract in Kootenai County Case No. CV 09-3537. A true copy of that complaint 
is attached to this third party complaint as Exhibit A. In that case Shelton claims that she. , 
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would not have settled the medical malpractice claim but for the representation of Owens & 
Crandall that the subrogation interest of the Idaho State Insurance Fund "had been taken care 
of." Shelton has also contended in the worker's compensation action that her claim to the 
settlement proceeds of the medical malpractice action is superior to that of the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund and that it has waived, acquitted· or is otherwise estopped to assert a 
subrogation claim to the settlement proceeds of the medical malpractice settlement. 
9. The Idaho State Insurance Fund breached a contract of settlement of its subrogated 
interest with Shelton. As a result of that breach of contract, Shelton has made a claim for 
professional malpractice against Owens & Crandall. If Owens & Crandall is liable to Shelton, 
then the Idaho State Insurance Fund is liable to Owens & Crandall for all or part of Shelton's 
claim against Owens & Crandall. 
10. The Idaho State Insurance Fund made a representation of material fact upon 
which Shelton and Owens & Crandall relied to their detriment, to wit: that the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund agreed as part of the settlement of Shelton's medical malpractice action to 
compromise its subrogated interest in the settlement of Shelton's medical malpractice action 
for $62,500 less a proportionate share of the attorney fees and costs incurred by Owens & 
Crandall in obtaining the settlement. This statement was false. The Idaho State Insurance 
Fund either knew that it was false or had no intention of honoring the representation. The 
Idaho State Insurance Fund intended that Owens & Crandall rely upon the representation. 
Owens and Crandall was ignorant of the falsity of the representation and relied upon it to its 
· detriment by allowing Shelton to enter into and by itself entering into the release agreement 
attached to the complaint as Exhibit A. This reliance was objectively reasonable and· 
justifiable. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Owens & Crandall has suffered _ 
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injury in the claim of Shelton for professional malpractice. 
WHEREFORE, Owens & Crandall prays for judgment against the Idaho State 
Insurance Fund for any amount that Owens & Crandall may be adjudicated liable to Shelton 
upon the claim of professional malpractice, together with prejudgment interest, costs of suit, 
attorney fees pursuant to law, and for such other and further relief as the court deems proper. 
DATED this£ day of June, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs 
OWENS & CRANDALL DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Joseph Jarzabek ~ail 
Elsaesser Jarzabek Anderson Marks & Overnight Mail 
Elliott, Chtd. Hand Delivered 
P. 0. Box 1049 __ Facsimile (208) 263-0579 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Michael E. Ramsden 
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Joseph Jarzabek 
E:t.SAESSER ~ ANDERSON 
MlUUtS & ELLl:O!I'l' I Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
102 s. Euclid Avenue, Suite 307 
p. 0. 130,c 10 4 9 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
[208) 263-8517; telephone 
[208) 263-0759; Facsimile 
Idaho State Ba~ No. 2678 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUD!CIJlt DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE: OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT): OF KOOTENAI 
PA~RICIA u. SHELTON, an ) 
individual; ) 
) 
Plaintiff, J 
) 
vs. ) 
J 
R. BROCE OWENS AND JANE DOE ) 
OWENS, husband and wife and ) 
the marital community composed) 
thereof; OWENS & CRANDALL, } 
PLLC, a limited liability ) 
company operating in the State) 
of Idaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and ) 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, l 
indi~idually. and in their ) 
capacities as p~inoipals, ) 
managers, agents, par·tners, ) 
repxe~entatives anQ employees} 
of OWENS & CRANDALL, PI.LC.; ) 
) 
Qefendants. ) 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Case No. c:1-CJ r- 3 S-f J-
COMPLAINT ~OR DAMAGES AND 
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COMES NOW, T.he a.bove-r1amed pladntiffr by and through her 
ettorney of .record, Joseph Jarza.beJc, a.nd heI eby allegeB end 
states as follows: 
1. At all ~imes material hereto Plaintiff Patricia 
Shelton was a resident of the State of IdQho and now reside5 in 
Otah. 
2. At all times material hereco Defeniants, R. BROCE 
OWENS al'ld JANE DOE OWENS were residemt:i of t~ e State of Idaho 
residing in Kootenai County~ 
3 . .At all times material hereto Defendant OWENS&. 
CRANDALL, PLLC, was a law firm operating in the Stat~ of Idaho. 
4. At all times material hereto defencants R. BRUCE OWENS 
and JEFFREY J. CF.A.NDALL were licensed attornE!{5 in the State of 
Iciaho and managers, agent~ and/or employees cf the law £inn OWENS 
& CRANDALL, PLLC, ro3iding and practicing law in the State 0£ 
Idaho. Ot\TENS advertioc:! he is a Civil Trial ,lpecialist. 
5. On February 3, 1997 SHELTON was injired in an 
automobile accident which left he:r pe:r:manentl~', t.otally disabled 
and unabie to care for herself. She suffered a C6-C1-Tl spinal 
injury resulting in tetrapelgia. SHELTON is~ quadriplegie. At 
the tiroe of her injury she was working so Ida]· o St:ate Insurance 
Fund, the worr.man compensation surety, commenced payment of 
benefits, including medical expense p~yznents. 
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6. On or about September 21, 2006 SF.:::::LTON wa!l admitted to 
a ca.re facility in Post Falls, Idaho for tr;iatment. The care 
and/or J.acJ< of care provided at this :facili·: y resulted in further 
injury to SHELTON. SHELTON retained R. BROC:E OW.ENS and the law 
firm of OWENS & CRANDALL, Pl'.,LC, to ;i;epressnt her on he.r medical 
malpractice claim against the facility and the providers who had 
acted negligently. She signed a fee agreeme :it .requ_ired by R. 
BROCE OWENS wherein she agreed to pay him a4J his law fi.r.rn 40% of 
any amounts recovered by her. SHELTON reli~d on the expertise 
of OWEN and his representation that he was a Civil Tria.l 
Specialist when making decisions required of her during the 
per1dency of her malpractice claim. 
7. A meciiat:.ion on SHELTON' s medical rr.ilpractice claim 
took place in Seattle, Washington Septemoer :o, 2008. erior to 
the mediation OWENS sent to the mediator, Gr~gory L. Burtram, a 
Mediation Statement. In the statement OWENS ~el~ted SHELTON'S 
medic::al expense had increased an average of :: eve:n hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) per year because of the 
malpractice of the care providers and the facility. Re ~tated 
her additional medical expense would be at lea~t four million 
dollars ($4,000,0000.00] during her remaining lifetime as a 
result of the malpractice. He requested the facility and care 
providers pay SHELTON five million dolla:rs ($S,000,000.00) to 
settle her claim. On or about February 6, 2CJ9 SHELTON, relying 
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on the advice and experience of OWENS, Civi:t Trial Specialist, 
signed a "Full Release and Settlement AgrBerent" which settled 
he.r modical malprac-cice claim. A copy of tb·= of the release with 
her signature is labeled Exhibit "A", attacl:~d hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein as if set fort1 in full. P.rior to 
signing this agreement OWENS had told SHELTOll the subrogation 
cl3i.m of ldaho State Insurance Fund was ta.ke11 care of. She 
rGlied on his advice and representation in·m~king her decision to 
settle her claim. 
8. At all times mater~al hereto Idaho State Insurance 
Fund had a right to be reimbursed by SHELTON for all monies it 
had p.!lid her for her medical care and any ot.ti~r benefits related 
to the malpractice. This right of subrogatic:•:i is C.t'eated by 
Idaho Code S 72-223. By law Idaho State In~u~ance Fund is 
enti tlcd to be :i:eimbursed not only for past c. c.pense it was 
obligated to pay but also fer future expense .. t. is obligated to 
pay out of any mon.ey receiveid by SHELTON from her settlement 
after OWENS and hi., law firm. wr::re paid their il'ttorney fees and 
reimbursed for any costs they had advanced on her behalf. 
9. On March 6, 2009 O;:ivid R .. Skinner, .m attorney for 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, ~ent correspondence to OWENS 
notifying him State Insurance Fund would not \, ai v~ its 
subrogation claim against SHELTON and wanted to be reimbursed. 
On March 16, 2009 OWENS sent a letter to Idahc State Insurance 
COMPI.A.INT FOR DAMAGES AND 
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Fund requesting they tell him the amount of their subrogation 
claim. A copy 0£ that correspondence is lal: :iled Exhibit "B", 
attached hereto and by this reference incorp,~rated herein a:. if 
set forth in full. This letter was sent ove:~ a month after OWENS 
had advised SHELTON to settle her claim and ltad told her the 
subrogation claim of Idaho State Insurance F· .. nd was not an issue. 
As of March 16, 2009 neither OWENS nor hi~ hw firm Jcn~w how much 
SHELTON had to pay State Insurance Fund. 
ll. On April 7, 2009 at~orney David R. Skinner, acting on 
behalf of Idaho State Insuranco Fund, wrote C~ENS and informed 
him State Insurance Fund had paid a total of three million eight 
hundred and thirty eight thousand five hundrej and fifteen 
dollars and ninety-six cents ($3,838,515.96) Ln medica1 benefits. 
on April 9, 2009 OWENS sent a letter to Plain~iff's counsel 
relating he and his firm had received from SH~LTON four hundred 
sixty thou5and dollars (!?4,60, 000. OD} for atto.:ney fees and 
twenty-five thousand four hundred and fifty-s,_x dollars and 
forty-six cents ($25,456.46) for costs it had advanced. He 
stated there was six hundred and sixty-four tl ,01.1.stl.nd, five 
hund.red and fort:y-th:ree dollars and fifty-foui· cents 
($664,543.54) left for SHELTON that he had pl:.ced in an account. 
SHELTON has no access t.o this account. She d,:,es not know whe;re 
the account is. She ha:s no account number. ;; HELTON never 
authorized OWENS to disburse any settlement ft. nds. OWENS has 
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never provided SHELTON an accounting of costs. 
12. Defendants have been po.id their ,1ttorney fees and 
costs in.the amount of four hundred eighty-fLve thousand, four 
hundred fifty-si~ dollars and forty-six cent;; ($485,456.46). As 
of the date of filing this Complaint, May 4, 2009, SHELTON has 
received no money. J:daho State Im:rurance Fu.1td has cla.imed ii: i.!I 
entitled to her entire recovery amount. 
13. On April 30, 2 DD9 Ida.ho State Ins·1rance Fund sen1: a 
letter to SHE:LTON' !!l counsel. They claimed tl· ey were anti tled to 
the all the recovery. A copy of th~t corresfondence is labeled 
Exhibit "Cn, attachsd hereto and by this ref€rence incorporated 
herein as if set forth in full. .tdab.o Code§ 72-223 allows 
Idaho State Insurance Fund to make this clain·. 
14. Prior to settlement of her medicaJ malpractice claim 
OWENS never informed SHELTON Idaho State Insucance Fund could 
terminate and/or reduce payment of compensati.·:m benefits to her 
if "she sett.led her malpractice claim. If he ·lad done so and 
obtained a :iunt certain f;tom Idaho State Insur ::mce fund for 
settlement of their subrogation claim ~his la~suit would not be 
necessary. 
.E'JRST CAUSE OF B.CIIQN 
NEGLIGENC.E. 
Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1-14 above as if fully set 
forth herein. 
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15. Defendant.9 r and ea.ch of them, ow,: d Plaintiff a duty 
to inform her of the law in the State of Ida.:10 as it related 'to 
not only her malpractice claim but a~ 1't rel3ted to the 
subrogation claima of Idaho State Insurance rund which could be 
asserted against any .recovery she obtained ui icier Zdab.o Cods § 72-
223. OWENS failed to obtain from Idaho Stat:, Insurance Fund a 
sum certain that could be paid them to settl,,, their claim of 
subrogation. Defendants should have obtainer: for. Claimant a 
partial lump sum ~greernent approved by the Icaho Industrial 
Commission, the adjudica~ing body for workma~ comp~nsation claims 
in the State of Idaho, setting forth the am.ot1nt due Idaho State 
Insurance Fund upon settlement of her malprac~ice claim. The 
lump sum agreement and Order of the Idaho In~lustrial Commission 
wo1.1ld. have constituted a full and final resol..1tion of the claim 
by Idaho State Insurance Fund. Knowing the e,oeact amount !daho 
State Insu~ance had to ba peid would have allJwed SHELTON to make 
an informed decision on whether or not to set:le her malpractice 
claim. On February 6, 2009 SHELTON had no kn-,wledge of 'the 
amount that was claimed due by Id,=:1ho State In.mrance Fund. Sha 
had no knowledge of that amount because of thn negligence of 
Defcmdants. OWENS failed to obtain from Iclah1> State Insurance 
Fund a sum certain thus depriving Plaintiff SI IELTON of the 
ability to make an informed decision on wheth!!r or not to settle 
her malpractice claim. 
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16. Defendants knew or should have krown Idaho State 
Ins~~ance Fund would claim entitlement to a~ offset and/or 
termination of be:nefits until an amount egua .. to all amounts 
recovered by SHELT01'1, after deiduetion of th(;!,; .r attorney fees -and 
reimbursement of costs t.hey had advanced, ha:! bec:n u:,od up on 
payment of medical expense. If Defendants b,:.d told SHELTON at 
mediation that she W'Ould receive nothing fro11. the sett.lement and 
the only payrneni: made would be t:.o OWENS for r:ttorney fees and 
coses and to Ida.ho State Insurance Fund for :i: ehnbu.rsement of 
medical expense it had paid for her, she wou;.d not. ha,re settled 
hez: malpractice claim. SHELTON gained nothing from t:he 
:set::t:.lement. All the settloment: did is allow Idaho State 
Insurance Fund t:.o terminate payment of benefj_~s to her until the 
subrogHtion issue is decided by the Industri~t Commission. 
SHELTON thought she was going to receive six 1undred and sixty-
four thousand, five hundred and forty-three c,11ars and fifty-
four c:e.nts '($664,543.54); so far she has rocelved nothing and has 
been required to incur additional attorney feis and costs in 
prepar~tion for the hearing scheduled by the [n~ustrial 
commission June 17, 2009. 
BREc\CH OF CONTMG! 
Plaintiff realloges paragaraphs 1-17 at, :ive as if fully set 
forth herein .. 
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18. SHELTON had. a contract with Defer.dan'Cs. The contract 
required Defendants to use their best effortl ~o obtain r.ecovery 
for SHELTON on her medic~l malpractice claim. The contract 
required Defendants to adeg:uat.ely inform SHE:,TON about Idaho law 
as it related to her malpractice claim and tl,e eiub.roga't:ion claim 
asserted by Idaho State Insurance Fund under Idaho Code§ 72-22.3. 
Defendants breached their contract. Thoy f~iled to properly 
advise SHELTON. She reili~d on t.heir represel'tations at mediation 
that the subrogation issue had been dealt with. She .relied on 
~heir representations prior, during and follcwing the mediation 
hearing on decisions ~he made relating to hr.ii: m.al)?ractice claim. 
Defendant5 breached their contract with her ~,~en they advised her 
to sign the release February 2, 2009. They r~presented ~o 
SHELTOt-a she would receive six hundred and six::y-fou:r: thousc!.lnd, 
five hundred and forty-three dollars and fiftf-four cents 
($664,543.54]; as a result of their breach sh? received no't:hing 
and her workman compemsa1:ion benefits have be1 ~n terminat1:1d. 
WHERErORE, Plaintiffs pray as follow: 
1. Under Plaintiff's first cause of ac:~ion for judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff for general and special damages against 
Defendants in an amount within the jurisdicti:,n of this Court to 
be proven at trial. 
2. Onder Plaintiff's second cause of a:tion for judgment 
in favor of Plaintiff for gener.il a.nd special dama.ges ::i.9a.:l.nst 
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Defend.ants in an amount within the j u.risdic·:ion of this Court to 
be proven at trial. 
3. For an award to Plaintiffs of the .. :i: atto.rney fe?ee and 
costs inc~rred in p~osecution of th~ir clains as allowed by rule 
and statute. 
4. For ~uch other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and equitable. 
FURTHER, Plaintiff demands a jury triatl on all issues 
contained harein. 
DATED this 
COMPLAINT FOR DAMA.GES AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL -10-
ZAB!lK, attorney for 
PATLICIA J. SHELTON 
WHITEHEt.D lil-l PAGE l.<J/~5 
0S/0 7/200g 09:B3 
04/09/28~9 11:14 
12087 
2DB7654076 PAGE El3/8? 
. : . 
1. Relc.,,,.~ 
For tho o:u~lderation of ONE MILUON_ ONE HUNDRE-~ FIFTY ~OUSANP 00/100 
Dollar.; ($1,150,000.00), I fon:vcrrclcasc 1 
-7.ll.Dd. rh=r 
attomers, age<Wi, cmplcyccs, mbsidia,;icsi nnd assigns., any and :al) ofitet persons_ and e:ntitic:; fot 
"1-tose condut:.l they may be ll.1blo or for u,,hom they may be contri~ly obligated t.o provido 
Pt0fcssionat li11.bili7:f in$urancc tlOVCt:lgt: ("'Parties Rb\casedj, ti'o"h all cwm9 nnd ~ of 
action, whic:h. m.A)' evt:r be assc::rted by the undcr:ilisne4, bcr exccut'>n., adminisn:atx:m:, successos:::s, 
' I I • 
lllSigns, or othm, .v..hether sll.Cr, cla~ or ca~ of action 3Jtl pt!!!~-:.ntly known or unlcncwn., 
which in any~ arise ou1 of~ facts statod ic tho Complaint fUoJ in 
, or which in any way i.n11t>lvc the diagnosie, ,ean: and ttcatmatt, or the 
f11ih1re to din.gnose or treat. PATRICIA J. SREl. TON during hct 11.~ions as a po.tic:atat 
io the ye:an 2006 D.Od 2001, or nt any time to the 
prcseat. 
This" Full Relcu::: and Setl:letnc:at Agrcc:mcnt (homlnaftcr r~~ to as ··Agrt:emcnt") is 
inteaded to oover any and .alt future injuries. damages or lo~ not 'CllOWJl to the parti~ to this 
Agrccm~ but wh.iah may later d~l~ ·or be di:icovcred in ~cdion wi.tll the above-
referenc:cd diagnosis, c:11c and tteatmeot. or fe.Uure to di.agno,c; or 1nat, indudin~bUt not lim~ 
to, wrongful dc:nth claim, or IO.!a of consortiwn claims and sbaJI be: :-,mdiog an. our acruaJ or 21'IY 
p0SSl'b1e hcin, ex~, ad~cistntort, 1'1.nd assigns. 
The undersignod acknowledges th.at she has ~ tho a.bl: v~c:rcnced cansidetat:ion 
83 compensation fo[ llY and all injuries, damaecc and lo5SCS (past, r- resent aod filtm"c. bi.own and 
unknown), which were or could ever be c!Jlimcd in eannoctlon with ! he abovc--refereneed 
diagriosis, care end t'l'.t::l.tmetlt, or faifurc to dtagnose or trriat, ioaJudm g but Mt limited to 1 
wrongful dcoth claims.or los.!J o!.consottium cl~mis and-sball be-bind lng-on.ol.ll' B.CltUal or any 
possible hdrs, i:xccutors. .o.dmln.istrators.. arid assigns. 
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The undC"t"Signcd warrants that no promise ot iodu cnt 'lllS been offQ't:d except as' 
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nerein' :1ct fonh and thal this Agrecnic:nt i::; c.x~cutcd witho t rclia1icc upon any ~!atcmcnt or 
representation by the Parties R~lcascd or their rq,~cat.ati es oou,:i:ming the ~ and extent of 
the injuries, and/or damages, and/or legal liability therefor 
2. !oooroomcation for Subrogation and, Lien Claims 
The undor:igncd acknowledges that all subrogatio~and lir.n claims 'Irising out of contract 
or under state or rederal. law, induding but not limitr:d to, y sub1 o_sation o~ lien claims of 
·Patricia Sbelto111s hc:alth care providers, insurance c:an:iors the De11anment of Social and Health 
. . 
Sc::rvicl?'3 and any fedt!ral or state agency ot programs such ~ Med .care, Medicaid, Vet~•s. 
Ad.rninistrntion, Workmen's Compensation Progtani and/or tbe Id:, bo State l'.nsurancc Fund, nte 
. . 
the sole and separate obUgation of tho undersigned whioh lbc tmde:"Signc::d agree= to pay or 
otherwise rdOlve. · 
The under,igncd further hereby eovcnnnts to dcl"cnd, inda:rnify and hold hmmlcss the 
Panies Rclcascd., aod thi:iir aUorn~ agents and assigns from and r1.~nm any further claims 
arising from or1t:l:rtcd to th.e health care provided,. iru:ludillg all sue: 1 lien and subrogstion. claims-. 
' . . ' 
This hold bar.mless pr'ovi.si0n includes the: costs nnd attomt:y' .t1 f~ .ncwn:d in the dc:fcn~c of 
such claims. TI1c Released Parties retain .the right to monitor the defense of any such claim or 
action. · 
3. Wammt,v.,gf'Cop11city to ,Execute Agreemgtt 
The: under.signed warrants that no other porson or entity ha.!l or ha9 had any interast in the 
claims or causC!l ~f. action r:t:fcrrcd to in this Release .and Settlement Agreement .ind that the 
undersigned bas.the sole right and ~cb..1si"e aulhority to ~ecutc thi:; Rc:li::ase and Settlement 
Agrocmentand receive the sums :specified in it. The undctSig0ed sb,u.l defend nnd indemnify the 
Parties Reli:a:.cd should aey other peaon c:.laim to ruivc: an interest it, the claims and iajuriis 
described. in this Release and Settlement Agreement 
.i+. Confidenf.ii!litx 
' As part.of.the co.Clciidcration.far lhe sums: pay.:ib[e..undc:r.this /·,grccmcnt, tbe undersigned , . 
agr~e th.at neither she nor her attorneys, ae-CJJts. :is.signccs., or :;ucecSs, •rs sball ~l to or discuss 
05/07/20~9 09:03 
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with i:&nycru:, including the media, other tban ~ may be a.g::n:::i;d tr, in writing by the Parties 
Released •or. as may be ~quired by law, the NIOJC! or identities c, i·th~ Parties Released by, ~ 0 
sums payable wder, or any of tho 0th.cc ~eans or conditions of tit is Agrceimcnt, except t}Jar the ' 
und~cd may disclo:.c such infoonation to immediate fumily members or. to the octcnt 
reasonably nc:ccssary, to persons prov:iding )eg~ financial, Or c:cr:JnSCiing services to the 
. . . 
un~gned provided Chat any 61.tnily member ot -pcrsoc to who11.1 such infotmation i:. di:,closed 
is in.muctod and agrees not to publish or further disc.lose: inform11 -:ion, but pJaintlff may 
communicate the amount of and fact's oftbis settJement to her ttrrli.cal insun:o. 
5. 
This Release .and Settlement Agrcemcn1 shall be comtrucil and intcrpreicd according to 
the lavm of the state of Idaho. 
6. DgualofLia!;,if ity 
This Agreement c:preru:es Jhc full and complete ser:tlcmeri : of all liability claims. 
Liability for such cJaims ~ expressly denied by_ the Parties Rele.lSnd.. Regardless of the adequacy 
0f the above consideration. the 3CCCJ>tanec of this release shall nol: cpemtc 11.5 an admission of 
liability on the part of the Parties Released. 
I.HA VE COMPLElEI. y RE.AI? nrrs FINAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT. 
AGREEMENT ANO FULLY UNDERSTAND AND VOLUNTA. UL Y ACCEPT tr FOR Tira 
PURPOSE OF FINAL RESOLUllON AND SETTLEMENT OF .-\.NY AND ALL CLAIMS. 
D!SPUTED OR OTIIER WISE., AND FOR THE EXPRESS PURJl OSE OF PRECLUDING 
FOREVER ANY OTHER CLAlMS ARISING OUT OF OR IN A'.i/.Y WAY CONNECTED 
WITH TifE rNCtDENTS, INJURIES, OR DAMAGES ABOVE 1'•ENTIONED. 
I RECOGNIZE TIIA T THE FUTUR.E COURSE OF P~l€NT rNJUR Y OR OTI-JER 
DAMAGES CANNOT BE PREDICTED wmI CERTAINTY. "r .-~SSUME THE RISK 1HA T 
THE, CLAIMED INJURIES OR DAMAGES MAY WORSEN IN' J-IE FUTURE AND TI-lA T 
NE.W .tNJUPJ,&S OR DAMAOES MAY.DEVELOP. I ACKNOW,.,EDGE THA "t'. M¥ 
lNFORMA TION REGAR.DING Cr.AIMS MADE rs StJFfIC[EN" 4 TO ENTBl:t l'NTO T-HIS 
P.::iGE 22/25 
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RELEASE ANO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Al'[O EXPR.Ei::sL Y WAIVE ANY CLAIM 
. . ' . . 
THAT THIS RELEASE IS NOTFA[R1 .. Y
0
ANDKNOWINGt1! MADE. 
DATED this (c, day of February, 2009. 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of 09:u I 5 
) 
) ss. 
) 
On this d:iy per.:ionaUy nppearcd before me ,PA TRlCIA J. S-:ffil TON re me known to b0 
the iodividual dcscribod in and who executed the within and forogc, ing instrument, and 
~ckncwledgc::d that she siened tbc same as her free and \IQ}untar:y a,: t and deed, for the uses and 
purposes therein ru.cntioocd 
GIVEN undet" my hnad and official ses.l thi:i G:, day of Fel:,1Jo.ry, 2009. 
rlJ ol)~Al ~a,·,ro 00 ............ ____ 
~BUC in ~d fur the State 
of Utah, tcSiding at J<.1 Ul -e..., UTc:i.Jr 
My commission expire-;; 3 'Z.SJ Z.Oj '2..-
r,,;'D~-
120s7Ei~, . Jc 
vJHITEHEAD AMBER 
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The undersigned. atu:,mcy for Plaintiff, in cottncction witif the mattr:1.11 and things set forth· 
' ' 0 • • •. I • o 
in the foregoing Release aod Scttlomcnt Agreement. l1ereby: 
l . Gusrantees thB.t the signattm: to this Agreement is : be :iignxturc of the P'laintiffjn 
this Jn"I.VSUit and the individual named in the A~cm.cnt; 
2, Agrees, as part of the conside:ration for the :,1cttlem_1! ot of this matter and the: 
inclusion oflhc plaintiff's attorney as payee on the scttlr:mc:ot dral: ~ to pay out of the scttl~e11t 
ptoc:c:eds or otherwise resolve aJI ko.ovm subrogation clnims :utd lii:ns in conjunction with the 
claimed iajuries and damages such that the Parties Relca,ed :ib:iH l:avt:1 no liability for such 
~own subrogation or lic::n c[aims. 
3. Agrt:es, as pan of the considi:(1Jfion for the settlemc:r: t of~ action Md the: 
inclusion of the Plaintiffs a.ttomc.y as payee on the :id:tlement dr.ift 1 tc be bound by the tcmis,:in 
paI'38mph 4 oflhis Agr=ment"((dating to confide13tjafity) as d10ugli she had signed this 
A.grecmant as a releasing ~~ijyr~ p.:iey. 
DATED this ___Ll:day of February, 2009.· 
Checlc 
One 
lndlvldu1I 
hrtrrcnblp 
Sohr Pnlprlc:JOr 
CCl'plJl'lltlon 
XX., .F.LLC: . 
Owens & Crandall, PLJ ~C 
I 
)J=; =--
R. Bruce Owens 
Name• Glf:E:NS & CRAND1tL:L. l?LLC 
Tax Identification Number 20-:4_781760 
.. ........ 
,.· \ ,, 
.. ~, / 
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PAGE 2.:1/25 
05/07/2809 09:03 12087G 
,..,, 
a') 
0 
c,r,. 
0 
c:;::, 
r_. 
co 
~ 
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0 
N"J 
L.I~ 
'R. Btl:cc 01wa,.-+ 
J rl'fr.') .1. Ct .. nd•fl., 
Jeff,')' R. o~r.i 
Resin• M Meer~~.,. 
Un~cy E.. MatrlJcn 
·C:•11 .~ •• i;.,..i.11i, 
--•L • l.l«n..:d I~ !O ~ \ll,\ 
• l.Jcc•nod ,r. 10, 'V,- !o: Cl OWENS & CRANDALL 
State: In-ou.ra.r.ce Fund 
P. 0, Bo,c: B3720 
.Boise ID -83720-CIO•M-
.FQJted: !208-3:32-,2433 
Attention: Tc:rcl!lB.. Raymond 
.Re: P:abici::a. Shc.itan 
Claim No. 97~:2S9 
Attorney:; -Ar L.w 
: 819 N. ~kC'i"Oed Dw: . .Sr., ID~ 
C,>ct:rd'l'J-:nc. i,io1n,, ~;1!.!J, 
l'ho"~ /ZORi 5tii-/l~a:.> 
F:u< (lOf:) 1;,l~- I 9:,~ 
,.,_.,.w .owi.'T. ic r~ndJ II. e,, !Tl 
r hJJv:e bcc::a ~F: ye,~ now for g;pp. oxi,me.Cdy mr~e we<::~$ in ot'dc:r to dctcrm.il'\e 
tbc subrogi.,.tcd interest flu(t tb,c: State L~oc .Ftuld ic ucct~ng With -~ to thi:o: 
mati:tt. As YQU :ec:all, d.u~."Chc Jnodlatfoa.lant: Scptcc.ber, ~-1 were crmte.etcd t?Y the 
.fflC'dia.tor, Or.egocy L, B~, iuid ,YtN e.Ql'l-ac:d ~ ~t -ttlu St~tc lns~t.nce Fund 
would t\'ettle on their i:sub.Togs.t!0t1 or $6~.ooo :Jr:s:s .:il .pro ra.ta ?: bare ,of feca 1md cdstl-. 
That i:i ·the ~re that ~ relied Uptin in out Mgot:iaticm:, w:J.1 h the carrier Ln finally 
gi:t.Li::l(t thJc matttr·reso~·t:d ~t m~, 
Wi: have b.a.cl tbi:: sottJerncnt ,Pt"ocecdt:I ii, ou.t t:l;"U.8t accour. t 101" three wee1ts .a.gd l 
don't tllink it i3 othii:al for me tc withho1d -fheni any lo::iger, 1 thlok my cliC1;1t is 
e.ctitlcd to her pro~= lCJs the subrogated alQU'Q t,y me State: ln:s:u • .:i.ncc: Fune!.. For 
that Tea~. l ha.vc bec:n :I:,. contact w:i'u\yot.l ~ try aslc:i cl.ctc:rmh:1? what that D.ttiount b. 
7 don't think i can :w.-itbl:iold tbcsi::: fa:nd.s m:i_y'langer for m:v .c:lir nt, in w>.od f.Q:Jth, and 
therefore in:tiat !:ha.t th<: St.mtc Jm~raJlce i'und p,rovid:e me tb.~, number .c,n er 'before 
Wcdm:sc;lay, Mra,rcb ie, 1t i$ .my i.ri.lt!tlt to scad. r'atrid.a.. h~~han oC'thc _proceedc from 
th~ ,cittloment on cniu: dJui: u'hcther l haw: -hearo frtim the Stn tr: h:isw-Anc::e F':lnd 0r 
noL 
RBO:jb 
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---------------------------------------- -M•• _, U • • 
40 
05/07/2009 09:B3 12t!B76 
DA VII> RUPERT SKINNER 
Aaomey At L.,w 
drupc:rtski n.oo@aoleotn 
\l.HITE.H£AD AM 
6098 Tonkin Drive Boise, Idaho 83704 Phouc208-376-191 J 
April30,2009 
R Bruce Owens (btncc@cdalawyer.com) 
Owens & Crandall, PLLC 
185 9 N. Lakewood Drive. Ste. 104 
Coeur d'.A.lene> JdBho 83814 
Re: Pntrlcia J. Shelton, Claimant vs. Auto Phone Corporal ion, Employer, aod 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety. 
r.c. No. 1997-005067 
Dear Mr. Ow~ 
PAGE '25/25 
This letter is in response to your Jetter to Teresa Raymo~ d dated March 16., 2009, 
written approximately two weeks aft1:t yon settled the medical 11 talpractice ~ on behalf 
of Patricia Slic:lton. In chat letter you requested tbn! the State Iru urance Fund provide you 
with the amount of its su.broE,Sted cl.aim. The subrogntion claim of the Stato Insurance 
Fund for medice.l benefits paid to~. :md for future medical bl! acfits ~ting from the 
medic..al malpractice, cxc;.ec:ds the tom1 amount of SI, 150,000 th11t you. reccived in the 
settlement. That was the total bdore you deducted your attornc:-,·· s fee of $460,000 and 
approx.l.mately $25,000 for costs. Ther.c:fore the State Il13UfflD.cc :<und requests thm you 
:immediately tender the amount of SJ ,150,000 less our pro mtn share of reasonable 
.tttorney fe~ and coru. It is my understanding that Rich.ard Wbi tehead is representing 
your interests on the rensonableness of your attomey fc:e so I hll,,e forwarded a copy of 
this lc~r to him. The Stntc Insurance Fond will begin off..:ctt:ing ~ payment ofbeoi:fits 
on behnlf of Patricia Sbclton against the amount of the settlancz:;· : beginning on May 1 o. 
2009. 
Sincerely, 
David R. Skinner 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Richard 'Whitehead 
. Joseph Jarznbck 
Sent by ~ail on April 30, 2009 
EXHIBIT 
i C 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PA TRICIA J. SHEL TON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. BRUCE OWENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, a 
limited liability company operating in the 
State of Idaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
and employees of OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Third party plaintiff, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Third arty Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-3597 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
Defendants move the court for its order granting summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
56(b). This motion is based upon the abatement of the plaintiffs claim against the defendants 
and upon the lack of any attorney-client relationship between the defendants and Lois M. 
Bishop or the estate of Patricia Shelton. This motion is supported by the memorandum served 
with this motion. 
DATED this ..h_ day of May, 2010. 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the L day of May, 2010, I served a true and co1Tect copy of the 
foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Joseph Jarzabek ~ Mail 
Elsaesser Jarzabek Anderson Marks & __ Overnight Mail 
Elliott, Chtd. Hand Delivered 
P. 0. Box 1049 __ Facsimile (208) 263-0759 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Michael E. Ramsden 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CL[TVi D,'STr:ir-1- ,.,-,URT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PATRICIA J. SHEL TON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. BRUCE OWENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, a 
limited liability company operating in the 
State ofldaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
and employees of OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Third party plaintiff, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Third a Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-3597 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
Defendants submit this memorandum in support of their second motion for summary 
judgment. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. On February 3, 1997 plaintiff Patricia Shelton (Shelton) was involved in an automobile 
accident that left her a quadriplegic. Complaint paragraph 5. 
2. She was working in the course of her employment at the time of the automobile 
accident. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, her employer's worker's compensation surety paid 
benefits to Shelton, including medical benefits. Complaint paragraph 5. 
3. On September 21, 2006 Shelton was admitted to North Idaho Advanced Care Hospital 
(NIACH) for the purpose of weaning her from the ventilator on which she had become 
dependent. Complaint paragraph 6. 
4. The care at NIA CH resulted in further injury to Shelton. Complaint paragraph 6. 
5. Shelton entered into an attorney-client relationship with defendant Owens. Owens 
provided legal representation for Shelton in her medical malpractice action against NIA CH. 
Shelton personally signed a fee agreement with Owens. Complaint paragraph 6. 
6. Shelton and the defendants participated in mediation with the care facility, its insurer 
and its lawyers on September 10, 2008. The Idaho State Insurance Fund also participated by 
telephone in the mediation. Complaint paragraph 7. 
7. The case did not settle that day, but did settle on or about February 6, 2009. The 
consideration for the settlement was $1,150,000.00. According to the contingent fee 
agreement between Shelton and the defendants, she was to receive $664,543.54 of the 
settlement proceeds net of the contingent fee and expenses incmTed by the defendants in her 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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behalf. Complaint paragraph 7; Shelton v. Auto Phone Corporation and Idaho State Insurance 
Fund, Order Approving Apportionment of Third Party Settlement Proceeds, IC 1997-005067, 
July 28, 2009. 
8. After the settlement of the medical malpractice claim, the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
staked claim to the entirety of Shelton's share of the proceeds. Complaint paragraph 9. 
9. On March 31, 2009 Shelton filed a worker's compensation complaint with the Idaho 
Industrial Commission for an adjudication of the amount due the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
on its subrogation claim to Shelton's recovery in the medical malpractice action. By way of 
a,nswer the Idaho State Insurance Fund claimed a subrogated interest to the extent of its 
payments as of April 5, 2009, 4,065,337.17 and for those amounts it would pay in her behalf 
in the future. Affidavit of Michael E. Ramsden. 
10. For dates of service from September 29, 2006 shortly after Shelton's admission to 
NIA CH until the date of the mediation September 10, 2008, the Idaho State Insurance Fund 
paid benefits for medical expenses for Shelton in the amount of $1,506,775.96. Affidavit of 
Michael E. Ramsden. 
11. On July 28, 2009 the Idaho Industrial Commission approved the settlement between 
Shelton and the Idaho State Insurance Fund. Shelton v. Auto Phone Corporation and Idaho 
State Insurance Fund, Order Approving Apportionment of Third Party Settlement Proceeds, IC 
1997-005067, July 28, 2009. As a result of that approved settlement, the Idaho State Insurance 
Fund received $270,000.00 of Shelton's proceeds of the medical malpractice action. Affidavit 
of Michael E. Ramsden. 
12. The scope of Owens legal representation and attorney-client relationship with Shelton 
was limited to the prosecution of her medical malpractice action against NIACH. Defendants 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 46 
never provided legal services nor counseled Shelton upon issues of estate planning or prepared 
any testamentary instruments for Shelton. 
13. Shelton passed away on or around November 10, 2009. Shelton was not married at the 
time of her death. Complaint paragraph 1; Affidavit of Michael E. Ramsden in Support of 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
14. Lois M. Bishop was aware of Shelton's death on or around November 10, 2009, but 
only provided the defendants with notice of Shelton's death on April 22, 2010. Affidavit of 
Michael E. Ramsden in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The standard for summary judgment is well-established. Indian Springs LLC v. 
Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009). "Summary 
judgment is proper when 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church 
v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). 
The moving party bears the burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cafferty v. State, 
Dep't of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 
(2007). The nonmoving party is entitled to have all disputed facts construed in her favor and 
is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences in her favor. Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 
160 P.3d at 746. If reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. McPheters v. 
Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003). 
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The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid useless trials. When there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, a trial court is 
justified in denying a trial on the merits. Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 340, 563 P.2d 395 
(1977). 
Whether or not a claim for economic loss caused in tort survives death is a question of 
law. Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192, 219 P.3d 1208 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). Kawai Farms, 
Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 
Idaho 552,555, 768 P.2d 815,818 (Ct.App.1989). 
INTRODUCTION 
Patricia Shelton died on or about November 10, 2009. Shelton was not married. Prior to 
her death, Shelton had commenced the present action for professional negligence. Idaho does 
not have a general survival statute. When a plaintiff to a tort action dies, the common law 
controls. At common law, a tort action does not survive the death of the recipient of the tort. 
Patricia Shelton's tort action was personal to her and abated upon her death. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SHELTON'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM ABATED UPON HER DEATH 
Idaho does not have a general survival statute. The common law governs the abatement 
of her claim for professional negligence. "In the absence of legislative enactment on a subject, 
Idaho Code § 73-116 specifies that the common law governs." Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 
192, 219 P.3d 1208, 1209 (Ct.App. 2009). At common law if the victim of a tort died before he 
recovered a judgment, the victim's right of action also died. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 
Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990), citing Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 125(a) (5 th ed. 
1984); Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 736 P.2d 1309 (1987); Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 
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151 P.2d 765 (1944); Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has long recognized this common law abatement doctrine. Craig at 1210, 1211; see also 
Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 621, 622, 495 P.2d 571, 572 (1972); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 
415,418, 184 P. 477, 477-78, (1919). 
Idaho courts apply the common law abatement doctrine to actions in tort. See Steele v. 
Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 136 P.3d 905 (2006) (applying the doctrine to a tort 
action for medical negligence (professional malpractice)).; Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192, 
219 P.3d 1208 (Ct.App. 2009) (abating the late plaintiffs cause of action for economic loss 
resulting from personal injury); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) 
(applying the doctrine to a tort action for personal injury such as assault and battery); Doggett v. 
Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888,477 P.2d 511 (1970) (applying the abatement 
doctrine to depletion of community assets resultant of personal injuries to a deceased spouse); 
Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309 (1987) (applying the doctrine to abate an 
action for pain and suffering due to personal injury). 
"[A]n action for legal malpractice is a tort action." Rice v. Lister, 132 Idaho 897,901, 
980 P.2d 561, 565 (1999); citing Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) 
(overruled on other grounds); Smith v. David S. Shurtleff and Associates, 124 Idaho 239,243, 
858 P.2d 778, 782 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). Consequently, Idaho law (applying common law) 
dictates that an action for legal malpractice (professional negligence) does not survive the 
death of a plaintiff and abates upon the plaintiffs death: 
In Steele v. Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 920-21, 136 P.3d 905, 906-07 
(2006), the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for. medical negligence in treating 
injuries from an automobile accident. The plaintiff Steele died before his medical negligence 
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claim was reduced to judgment. Id. Applying Idaho's common law, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that an action for medical malpractice abates upon the death of an unmarried plaintiff Id. 
The personal representative of Steele's estate could not maintain an action for medical 
negligence. Id., 142 Idaho at 921, 136 P.3d at 907. 
Patricia Shelton's action for professional negligence is no different from the action for 
medical negligence in Steele. Both actions sound in tort and the recovery soughtis based upon 
personal injury and resultant economic loss. Defendants can find no reason this court should 
treat a medical negligence action against a physician any different than a legal negligence 
action against an attorney. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals also addressed the issue in the recent case of Craig v. 
Gelling. 148 Idaho 192, 219 P.3d 1208 (Ct.App. 2009). Craig brought an action to recover 
economic loss resulting from personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Before the 
action concluded Craig died of unrelated causes. Craig was unmarried. The personal 
representative of Craig's estate then moved to be substituted. Id., 219 P.3d at 1209. The 
defendant brought a motion to dismiss. The Craig court rejected the three statutory exceptions 
to the common law abatement doctrine recognized by Idaho. 1 The Idaho Court of Appeals 
held as a matter oflaw that Craig's claims for economic loss caused by personal injuries abated 
1 (Plaintiffs death may create a new cause of action for wrongful death in favor of the heirs 
and representatives. I.C. § 5-311. Second, Idaho Code 5-327, expressly abrogated the common 
law rule that a personal injury action abated upon the death of the tortfeasor. Third, Idaho 
community property statutes provided that general damages for pain and suffering were 
personal and not community property as opposed to damages for economic loss, which are 
community property and a surviving spouse can maintain an action for such subsequent to the 
death of the spouse who sustained the injury). Id., 219 P.3d at 1210, citing Evans, 118 Idaho at 
216, 796 P.2d at 93, partially overruling Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., Inc., 93 Idaho 
888,892,477 P.2d 511,515 (1970). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ITJDGMENT- 7 50 
upon death and the personal representative of Craig's estate could not be substituted to carry 
forth the action. Id., 219 P.3d at 1209-1211. 
Similarly, Patricia Shelton brought this tort action for professional negligence and seeks 
economic losses. The exceptions to the common law abatement doctrine are not applicable to 
the facts of this action. According to Idaho law Shelton's professional negligence claim abated 
upon her death and Lois M. Bishop cannot be substituted to carry on this action. 
IT. THE DEATH OF PATRICIA SHELTON DESTROYS THE REQUIREMENT 
OF AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ANY STANDING TO 
MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
To maintain an action for professional negligence a plaintiff must show the existence of 
a direct attorney-client relationship. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co., of Hartford, 
146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P.3d 858, 864 (2008); Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 
526, 96 P.3d 623, 627 (2004) (citing McColm-Traska v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948,951, 88 P.3d 
767, 770 (2004); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 590, 21 P.3d 908, 912 (2001); Marias v. 
Marano, 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350,352 (1991); Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702,652 
P.2d 650 (1982)). Neither Lois M. Bishop nor Patricia Shelton's estate has an attorney-client 
relationship with defendant Owens. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this issue in Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 
134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). The Court held, as a matter of law, "[a] direct attorney-client 
relationship is required to exist between the plaintiff and attorney-defendant in a legal 
malpractice action except in this very narrow circumstance. An attorney preparing 
testamentary instruments owes a duty to the beneficiaries named or identified therein ... " to 
properly execute such documents. This narrow exception to the direct attorney-client 
relationship requirement allows heirs and beneficiaries to bring action for an attorney's 
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negligent drafting of testamentary instruments. Id. 
In this case, defendant Owens and Patricia Shelton had an attorney-client relationship. 
The scope of their relationship, however, was limited to Shelton's medical malpractice claim. 
Defendant Owens never drafted testamentary instruments for Shelton nor did he provide legal 
counsel on estate planning for Shelton. 
Defendant Owens never had an attorney-client relationship with Lois M. Bishop. 
Thus, defendant Owens did not owe a duty to Lois M. Bishop, Patricia Shelton's estate, or 
her heirs. As a matter of law, Lois M. Bishop does not have standing to bring a professional 
negligence claim against Owens. See Harrigfeld. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted. 
ill. ECONOMICLOSSRULEPROHIBITSRECOVERY 
The economic loss rule prevents Lois M. Bishop, personal representative of Patricia 
Shelton's estate, from recovering from the Defendants under a legal malpractice (professional 
negligence) theory because no attorney-client relationship exists. The damages claimed are 
the difference between the $62,000.00 less a pro rata share of attorney fees and costs that 
Shelton claims she thought she was settling the State Insurance Funds subrogation interest for 
and the $270,000.00 she decided to settle for. Affidavit of Lois M. Bishop at 9. This is a 
claim for purely economic loss and is not recoverable by Lois M. Bishop or the estate of 
Patricia Shelton. 
Purely economic loss is not recoverable in a tort action. State v. Mitchell Construction 
Co., 108 Idaho 335, 339, 699 P.2d 1349, 1353 (1984); citing Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 
Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); 66 Columbia Law Review 917, 918 (1966). "[A]n action 
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for legal malpractice is a tort action." Rice v. Lister, 132 Idaho 897, 901, 980 P.2d 561, 565 
(1999). "Unless an exception applies, the economic loss rule prohibits recovery of purely 
economic losses in a negligence action because there is no duty to prevent economic loss to 
another." Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005). 
Exceptions to its general rule of non-recovery in tort actions include: (1) economic 
loss is recoverable in tort as a loss parasitic to an injury to person or property; (2) where the 
occurrence of a unique circumstance requires a different allocation of the risk; and (3) where 
a special relationship between the parties exists. Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass 'n, 
126 Idaho 1002, 1007-1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-1201 (1994). 
None of the exceptions to the application of economic loss rule is applicable here. 
This professional malpractice claim is not a claim for a loss parasitic to an injury to person or 
property. Idaho has never recognized a unique circumstance requiring a different allocation 
of risk. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 30, 108 P.3d at 1002. No special relationship exists between 
Lois M. Bishop or the estate of Shelton and the defendants. There is no attorney-client 
relationship between Lois M. Bishop or the estate of Shelton and the defendants supporting 
any special relationship. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008, 895 P.2d at 1201; Blahd, 141 Idaho at 
301, 108 P.3d at 1001. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons no genuine issue of material fact exists. Defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
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DATED this t._ day of May, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
Michael Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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P. 0. Box 1049 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
t--crs· Mail 
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Hand Delivered 
. (208) 263-0759 
Michael E. Ramsden 
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PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an individual, 
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vs. 
R. BRUCE O\VENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, a 
limited liability company operating in the 
State ofldaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
and employees of OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, 
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OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
MICHAELE. RAMSDEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the defendants in this case, and I have personal knowledge 
of the matters set forth in this affidavit. 
2. I have attached a true copy of Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as 
Personal Representative of Patricia J. Shelton, which was served on defendants April 22, 2010, 
but apparently not filed with the court. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAU 
Michael E. Ramsden 
/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this{ __ day of May, 2010. 
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Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Fairfield, WA 
My Commission Expires: 4/23/2013 
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P. 0. Box 1049 
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US Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0759 
Michael E. Ramsden 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
) 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an ) 
individual; ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
R. BRUCE OWENS AND JANE DOE ) 
OWENS, husband and wi and ) 
the marital community composed) 
thereof; OWENS & CRANDALL, ) 
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company operating in the State) 
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Comes now Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Joseph 
Jarzabek, and hereby moves for substitution of Lois M. Bishop as 
personal representative of the Estate of Patricia J. Shelton. 
Patricia Shelton passed away during the pendency of this action. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
appointment of Lois M. Bishop as per~onal representative of the 
Estate of Patricia J. Shelton. 
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 25 (a) (1) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 22th day of April, 2010. 
BEK ANDERSON MARKS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND/OR SERVICE BY FACSIMILE 
I certify that on the 22th day of April, 2010, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method 
indicated below to the following: 
Michael E. Ramsden 
Ramsden & Lyons 
700 Northwest B 
P.O. Box 13 
PLAINTIFf'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Hand-delivered 
[] Fax: 208-664-5884 
LOIS M. BISHOP AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF PATRICIA J. SHELTON -2- Case No. CV-09-3597 
Cindy Elliott 
ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON 
MARKS & ELLIOTT, GHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
PATRICIA J. SHEL TON, 
Deceased. 
CASE NO. CV-2009- O/q"f°! 
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
Lois M. Bishop ls hereby appointed personal representative of the Estate of 
Patricia J. Shelton, deceased, with all statutory authority. Administration of the estate 
is unsupervised. 
These Letters are issued to evidence the appointment, qualification, and 
authority of the personal representative. 
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GO 
WITNESS: ______ Magistrate of the District Court, County of 
Bonner, State of Idaho, with the seal of the Court affixed this lJ) day of November, 
2009. 
JS/ DEBRA A. HEISE 
I I 
Magistrate Judge 
ST ATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bonner ) 
The undersigned, hereby accepts the appointment to the office of personal 
representative of the estate of Patricia J. Shelton deceased, and does solemnly swear 
that I wi.11 perform, according to law, the duties of personal representative of the estates. 
PO Box 1332 
Sagle, ID 83860 
Phone: (208) 263-7702 
. . /6-· 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to·before me this /[) day of November, 2009. 
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Comes now Plaintiff, by and through her attorney Joseph 
Jarzabek, and hereby moves for substitution of Lois M. Bishop as 
personal representative of the Estate of Patricia J. Shelton. 
Patricia Shelton passed away during the pendency of this action. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
appointment of Lois M, Bishop as personal representative of the 
Estate of Patricia J, Shelton. 
This motion is made pursuant to Rule ·25 (a) (1) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Cindy Elliott 
ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON 
MARKS & ELLIOTT, CHTD. 
Attorneys at Law 
102 South Euclid Avenue. Suite 307 
Post Offici3 Box 1049 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone (208) 263M8517 
Fax: (208) 263~0759 
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Attorney for Personal Representative 
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MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, 
Deceased. 
CASE NO. CV-2009- 0/qfJ/.°I 
LETTERS TESTAMENT ARY 
Lois M. Bishop is hereby appointed personal representative of the Estate of 
Patricia J. St)elton, deceased, with all statutory authority. Administration of the estate 
is unsupervised. 
These Letters are issued to evidence the appointment, qualification, and 
authority of the personal representative. 
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY 
Page 1 
EXHIBIT 
A 
' 
WITNESS: ______ Magistrate of the District Court, County of 
Bonner, State of Idaho, with the seal of the Court affixed this i.Q day of November, 
2009. 
)3/ DEBRA A. HEISE 
i . I 
Magistrate Judge 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bonner ) 
The undersigned, hereby accepts the appointment to the office of personal 
-representative of the estate of Patricia J. Shelton deceased, and does solemnly swear 
that I will perform, according to law, the duties of personal representative of the estates. 
PO Box 1332 
Sagle, ID 83860 
Phone: (208) 263-7702 
. . . . /Js-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to·before me this-/°!' day of-November, 2009. 
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COMES NOW Lois Bishop, Personal Administrator of the Estate 
of Patricia Shelton, and Responds to Defendants' Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants argue that because Patricia Shelton has passed 
away, her claim against Defendants dies under the common law rule 
of abatement. This argument is misplaced and relies on authority 
that does not bear on this issue. In fact, it is a well-settled 
rule in Idaho that claims for tortious actions that reduce the 
e&tate of the decedent do not abate upon the death of the 
claimant. This is especially true of tort claims where a 
contract forms the basis for part of the clairo. The question is 
not so much whether the claim is based on a tort or a contract, 
but whether the conduct reduced the value of the estate. 
Defendants also argue that because Patricia Shelton has 
passed away, the direct attorney-client relationship necessary 
for a legal malpractice claim is terminated. Again, Defendants 
rely on authority that does not bear on this issue. In reality, 
it is a most basic principal of law that a decedent's claims, to 
the extent they survive her death, pass to her estate upon her 
death. The attorney~client relationship must have existed at the 
time the claim arose, but it need not continue in existence 
through the litigation. Thus, the proper question is whether the 
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claim survived under abatement principles, not whether the 
attorney-client relationship continues to e~ist. 
r. U<t 
Finally, in one last attempt to find some basis upon which 
Mr. Owens might escape responsibility for his clear.malpractice, 
Defendants argue that the \\economic loss rule" prevents recovery 
of economic damages in a legal malpractice action. But again, 
the authority Defendants cite does not support the proposition 
Defendants advance. If the economic loss related to a legal 
malpractice claim could not be recovered in a tort claim, every 
single legal malpractice claim ever asserted would disappear. 
II. ABATEMENT 
Defendants argue that because Ms. Shelton has passed away, 
her claim for legal malpractice abates. They cite several cases 
that discuss instances where claims for medical malpractice have 
died along with the claimant. However, they have not cited a 
single case that states that a legal malpractice claim abates 
upon the death of the claimant. 
instead, they cite Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 901 for 
the proposition that a legal :malpractice claim \\is a tort 
action.'' Based on that principle, Defendants simplistically 
conclude that since tort clairos abate on the death of the 
claimant, and since legal malpractice claims are tort actions, 
then a legal malpractice claim must necessarily-abate upon the 
death of the claimant. 
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The problem ~ith Defendants' reasoning is that Idaho law 
does not say that all tort claims abate upon the death of the 
claimant. Rather, Idaho law says that to the extent a tort claim 
is a personal claim, such as libel, slander, or personal injury, 
the claim abates. Claims based on actions that reduce the value 
· of the claimant's estate, or that are ex contractu, or based on a 
contract, do not abate. 
An early Idaho case, Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 P. 
477 (1919) explained that principle in great detail. In that 
case, six people were harmed financially when the local druggist 
sold them sodium arsenate instead of sodium arsenite to kill the 
weeds on their farms. Forch (the druggist} died while the case 
was on appeal, and his estate argued that the cause of action 
.didn't survive, on the very grounds asserted by Defendants in 
this case. The Idaho Supreme Court said, 
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute 
providing otherwise, causes of action ex contractu survive, 
while causes ex delicto do not. However, there are well-
recognizeq exceptions to both branches of the rule. As was 
said by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Lee's Administrator 
v. Hill, 87 Va. 497, 12 S.E. 1052 24 Aro. St. Rep 666: 
The true test is, not so much the form of the 
action, as tbe nature of the cause of action. Where 
the latter is a tort unconnected with contract, and 
which affects the person only, and not the estate, such 
as assault, libel,· slander, and the like, there the 
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rule, '\action personalis,' etc., applies. But where, 
as in the present case, the action is founded on a 
contract, -it is virtually ex contractu, although 
nominally in tort, and there it survives. 
We have no statutory provision abrogating the common-
law rule of survival of causes of action abo~e referred to. 
Applying that rule to this case, it may be said that while 
the action is, in form, ex delicto, the cause is, in fact, 
ex contractu. The injury for which recovery is sought grows 
out of the contract of purchase of sodium arsenate 
represented by the vendor to be sodium arsenite, and the 
application thereof to the crops of appellant and his 
assignors whereby those specific pieces of property were 
destroyed. These facts distinguish this case from those 
where recovery is sought for injury to the person or for 
torts resulting in damage to the estate, generally, and make 
these claims assignable and cause them to survive the death 
of a party to the action. 
(Citations omitted.) 
The cases cited by Defendants do say that a legal 
malpractice action is a tort action. However, in those cases, 
the issue under consideration was sorn~ other side issue (such as 
~hether att.orney fees. would be allowable under the statute 
allowing for recovery of fees in commercial transactions). No 
case squarely states that legal malpractice cases are tort claims 
for purposes of abatement. And other Idaho cases do clearly 
recognize that a l~gal malpractice claim is a hybrid of contract 
and tort law, with a very strong contractual element. 
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Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 .Idaho 134 {2003), citing the 
Court's own decision in Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 706-07 
( 1982) , states, ''Legal malpractice actions are an arnalga:m of tort 
and contract theories .. An attorney's duty arises out of 
the contract between the attorney and his or her client. Johnson 
v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P,2d 650, 652 (1982) {"The 
scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by 
the purposes for which the attorney is retained.,,, ; Fuller v. 
Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 801 P. 2d 633 ( 1991) (tort of legal 
malpractice is also a breach of the attorney-client contract)." 
So while a legal malpractice claim is framed as a tort, and 
properly should be in many instances, the claim does necessarily 
involve significant elements of contract. The Kloepfer decision 
states that abatement only occurs for a claim that is a "tort 
unconnected with contract." Clearly, at the very least, Idaho 
la~ recognizes that legal malpractice claims are connected with 
contract. Therefore, they should not abate. 
Idaho is not alone in this reasoning. A quick search of 
American Jurisp.:rudence yields the same reasoning. The opening 
sentence of American Jurisprudence 2dr Abatement, Survival, and 
Revival, Section 84 states, "The failure of an attorney to 
properly represent a client, whether by a breach of duty or by 
negligence, constit~tes a breach of contract, and an action based 
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on such breach survives the death of either party." Page 164. 
Defendants have stressed the similarity between medical 
malpractice and attorney malpractice, urging that the cases 
relative to medical malpractice also apply to attorney 
malpractice. But in each case, the arguments stretch the 
imagination and ignore the clear wording of kloepfer. There 
could be nothing more "personal" thart personal injury, and in the 
legal malpractice world, at least, there could be nothing more 
"contractual" than a breach of an attorney's promise to represent 
the client with reasonable skill and diligence. 
This difference is recognized in Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Abatement and Revival, Section 142, where the differences in 
attorney :malpractice and medical malpractice a.re addressed in 
·adjacent parag:c:.aphs u.nder the heading "Negligence": 
Negligence. or malpractice of attorney. Under statutory 
provision, a cause of action for damages arising out of an 
attorney's malpractice survives either his death or the 
death of the injured party, Under some authority, a 
malpractice cause of action is based upon contract, and, 
therefore, survives the death of the attorney at common la~. 
A cause of action for malpractice may also survive since it 
is considered to involve injury to personal property. 
Negljgence of physician or surgeon. E~cept under some 
statutes providing that a cause of action and a pending 
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action survive against a physician or surgeon for damages 
for want of skill, negligence, or malpractice, the cause of 
action does not survive regardless of whether it is based on 
contract or tort. 
Clearly, the two types of negligence are very different. 
Therefore, it would be improper to apply the cases relative to 
medical malpractice cases to cases involving attorney 
malpractice. 
III. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Defendants argue that because Ms. Shelton has passed away, 
there is no attorney-client relationship. Thus, they argue, the 
legal malpractice claim perishes. This argument is absurd on its 
face. The conduct Ms. Shelton complained of occurred during her 
lifetime. There was an attorney-client relationship then, as 
Defendants have admitted. A decedent's property, including her 
claims against third parties, devolves to the estate and the 
beneficiaries thereof, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 . 
. The.refore, tp.e _on,ly @estion is whether the claim survives. 
Defendants' reasoning would destroy every legal malpractice 
case where the aggrieved client has terminated his or her 
attorney-client relationship before resolution of the legal 
malpractice claim. l).nd it would be a strange rule indeed to 
require that a client remain in the attorney-client relationship 
until after the litigation for legal malpractice was complete. 
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· Yet that is what Defendants' reasoning requires. 
IV, ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
Defendants' last attempt to avoid responsibility for Mr. 
Owens' mistake reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
nature of a legal malpractice claim. As a general rule, in a 
tort claim, economic losses are not recoverable, as Defendants 
accurately note. However, application of that principle in a 
legal malpractice claim results in absurd consequences. 
Consider for a moment that under Defendants' reasoning, any 
legal malpractice case that resulted in economic loss (every 
legal malpractice case) would have to be thrown out before it 
ever got started. In each case, Defendants would insist, the 
legal malpractice claim would lie in tort; thus, in each case the 
economic loss rule would prevent recovery for those economic 
losses. If Defendants disagree with this statement, they should 
accept the challenge to posit a single case where any legal 
malpractice claim could go forward under the ~economic loss rule" 
. · -as .. they ha.ve de.s.cribed it . 
In reality, the economic loss rule does not apply to legal 
malpractice cl~irns, because those claims are based on contracts. 
No exception need be found-the rule simply does not apply in this 
situation. Defendants cite no authority to the ·contrary. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff prays that 
Defendants' Second Mo~ion for Summary Judgment be denied. 
Dated this 28th ~ay of June, 2010. 
JARZABEK ANDERSON MARKS 
CPONALD, CHTD. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an ) 
individual; ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
R. BRUCE OWENS AND JANE DOE ) 
OWENS, husband and wife and ) 
the marital community composed) 
thereof; OWENS & CRANDALL, ) 
PLLC, a limited liability ) 
company operating in the State) 
of Idaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and ) 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, ) 
individually, and in their ) 
capacities as principals, ) 
managers, agents, partners, ) 
representatives and employees ) 
of OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC.; ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-09-3597 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 1, 
2010. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on March 19, 2010. In addition, Defendants filed objections to the 
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affidavits submitted by Plaintiff in support of its Motion, and 
Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine objecting to the Affidavits of 
Michael Verbillis and Bruce Owens and seeking to strike those 
affidavits. A hearing on all motions was heard on April 22, 2010. 
With respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court finds that there are significant issues of material fact 
regarding the duty of care owed by Defendants and the damages 
suffered by Plaintiff. Therefore, summary judgment on Defendants' 
motion is not appropriate at this time. 
The Court has taken under advisement Plaintiff's Motion to 
strike the Affidavits of Michael Verbillis and Bruce Owens and for 
Partial Summary Judgment. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED. An order on the other pending matters 
will be issued in due course. 
DATED this """' l3 day of 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
_l"l_c._7 ____ , 2010 . 
John Patrick Luster, 
District Judge 
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JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
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Defendants submit this opposition to the plaintiff's motion to substitute Lois M. Bishop, 
personal representative of Patricia J. Shelton, as the plaintiff. Because the motion is futile, it 
should be denied. 
Although the plaintiff served an identical motion on April 22, 2010, the motion was not 
filed until May 10, 2010. It was at that time re-served. The motion is based on I.R.C.P. 
25(a)(l). 
Rule 25(a){l) provides: 
Rule 25(a)(l ). Substitution of parties- Death. 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the comt 
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for 
substitution may be made by the successors or representatives of 
the deceased party or by any party and together with the notice of 
hearing, shall be served on the pareties as provided I nRule 5, and 
upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons. If substitution is not made within a 
reasonable time, the action may be dismissed as to the deceased 
party. 
Rule 25(a)(I) is only applicable "[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished.,, 
As is set out at length in the defendants' second motion for summa1y judgment, Panicia 
J. Shelton's claim for legal malpractice against the defendants abated on her death. Substitution 
of Lois M. Bishop as the personal representative of the estate of Patricia J. Shelton would 
therefore be futile. 
The Idaho courts have recognized futility of amendment as proper basis for the exercise 
of the court's discretion in denying an amendment to a pleading. Hoots v. Craven, 146 Idaho 
271, 276~ 192 P.3d 1095, 1100 (Ct.App.2008) (proposed amendment did not state a claim for 8 Q 
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habeas relief); Spur Products Co,p. v. Stoel Rives UP, 142 Idaho 41, 122 P.3d 300 (2005) 
(McKee, J., dissenting) ( even though tlial cou11 weighed evidence in denying amendment, 
amendment would have been futile); Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc,, 141 Idaho 604, 612, 
114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005), quoting from Black Canyon Raquetball Club, hie. v. Idaho First 
National Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171,175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991) ("In determining whether 
an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of court is required wider Rule IS(a), 
the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the 
amended complaint state a valid claim. 11). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Lois M. Bishop's motion to substitute for Patricia Shelton is 
futile, as Shelton's claims abated upon her death. 
DATED this _.6.. day of July, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, 
By _________ _ 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SHELTON'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM ABATED UPON HER DEATH 
Shelton gives two reasons for her argument that her claim for legal malpractice survives 
her death: (1) under Idaho law claims based on actions that reduce the value of the claimant's 
estate survive; and (2) a legal malpractice claim is ex contractu and su1vives. Plaintiffs 
Response at 4. Neither reason supports survival of her legal malpractice claim under Idaho law. 
First, claims based on actions that reduce the value of the claimant's estate do not for 
that reason swvive. Macleod v. Steele, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254 (1926), which refe1red to New 
York statut01y authority stating that pdnciple, held only that an action for :fraud in the sale of 
stock was assignable. Macleod does not stand for the general proposition that any injwy that 
diminishes the value of the claimant's estate survives the claimant's death. Claims ex delicto 
do not survive the claimant's death, even though the value of the claimant's estate is 
diminished. Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192,219 PJd 1208 (Ct.App. 2009) (abating the late 
plaintiffs cause of action for economic loss resulting from personal injmy). 
Second, a legal malpractice claim is not ex contractu as Shelton argues. 
Shelton cites to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 418, 184 P. 477, 477-78 (1919) to 
support her claim that a legal malpractice claim is e.t contractzt. The Kloepfer court stated that 
the nature of the action rather than its form controlled, and that an action for crop loss in form 
ex delicto was in fact an action ex contractu and allowed the action to continue against the 
defendant's personal representative. Kloepfer is anachronistic in light of the legislative 
enactment ofldaho Code §5-327 in 1949, providing that certain actions smvive the death of the 
wrongdoer. Kloepfer does not reach the question whether an action survives the death of the 
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claimant. 
Even if the Kloepfer analysis holds sway, the Idaho courts have answered the question 
whether a legal malpractice case is ex delicto. The defendants raised this argument in their first 
motion for summary judgment. which this court declined to address in denying the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment from the bench. The gist of a malpractice action is negligence, 
not a breach of the contract of employment. Against an attorney the sole cause of action is in 
tort and not contract. Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932). A claim 
for breach of contract does not state a claim where a claim for malpractice exists. Hayward 
v. Valley Vista Care Corp .• 136 Idaho 342, 350, 33 P.3d 816, 824 (2001)~ Trimming v. 
Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661,662 (1932). 
Claims ex delicto abate upon the death of the claimant. See Steele v. Kootenai Medical 
Cellter, 142 Idaho 919, 136 P.3d 905 (2006) (applying the doctrine to a to1t action for medical 
negligence (professional malpractice)).; Craig v. Gellings. 148 Idaho 192, 219 P.3d 1208 
(Ct.App. 2009) (abating the late plaintiff's cause of action for economic loss resulting from 
personal injury); Evan.s v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) (applying the 
doctrine to a tort action for personal injury such as assault and battery);; Vulk v. Haley, 112 
Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309 (1987) (applying the doctrine to abate an action for pain and 
suffering due to personal injury). 
At the time of Shelton's death, Idaho did not have a general survival statute. Idaho 
Code Section § 5-327 was amended effective July 1, 2010. 2010 Idaho Sess.Laws Ch. 349. 
That amendment is not retroactive. Idaho Code § 73-101. Therefore. the common law governs 
the abatement of Shelton's claim for professional negligence. "In the absence of legislative 8 5 
enactment on a subject, Idaho Code § 73-116 specifies that the common law governs... Craig v. 
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Gellings, 148 Idaho 192,219 P.3d 1208, 1209 (Ct.App. 2009). 
At common law if the victim of a tort died before he recovered a judgment, the victim's 
right of action also died. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 
(1990), citing Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 125(a) (5 th ed. 1984); Vulk v. Haley, 112 Idaho 
855, 736 P.2d 1309 (1987); Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944); Russell v. 
Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944). The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized this 
common law abatement doctrine. Craig at 1210, 1211; see also Stucki v. Loveland, 94 Idaho 
621,622,495 P.2d 571,572 (1972); Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,418, 184 P. 477, 477-78 
(1919). 
Idaho courts apply the common Jaw abatement doctrjne to actions in tort. See Steele v. 
Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 136 P.3d 905 (2006) (applying the doctrine to a tort 
action for medical negligence (professional malpractice)).; Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 192, 
219 PJd 1208 (Ct.App. 2009) (abating the late plaintiff's cause of action for economic loss 
resulting from personal injury); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) 
( applying the doctrine to a tort action for personal injury such as assault and battery); Doggett v. 
Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888,477 P.2d 511 (1970) (applying the abatement 
doctrine to depletion of community assets resultant of personal injuries to a deceased spouse); 
Vu/Jc v. Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309 (1987) (applying the doctrine to abate an 
action for pain and suffering due to personal injury). 
"[A]n action for legal malpractice is a to1t action." Rice v. Lister, 132 Idaho 897, 901, 
980 P.2d 561, 565 (1999)~ citing Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991) 
(ovenuled on other grounds); Smith v. David S. Shurtleff and Associates, 124 Idaho 239, 243, 
858 P.2d 778, 782 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). Consequently, Idaho law (applying common law) 8 6 
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dictates that an action for legal malpractice (professional negligence) does not survive the 
death of a plaintiff and abates upon the plaintiff's death. 
Shelton refers to Am.Jur.2d and C.J.S. to distinguish legal malpractice cases from 
medical malpractice cases. A medical malpractice case is according to Shelton a 'Jlersonal 
injury," while a legal malpractice claim is a ''breach of an attorney's promise to represent the 
client with reasonable skill and diligence" and thus "contractual." First, as to .Am.Jur.2d the 
Idaho courts have already answered the question of the nature of an action for legal malpractice. 
It is in tort, not contract. Second, as to C.J.S. no statutory provision applicable to this case 
provides for the stuvival of Shelton's legal malpractice action. 
Shelton refers to Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2003); Johnson v. 
Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P.2d 650, 652 (1982) and Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 
P.2d 633 (1991) to supp01t her theory that a legal malpractice action sounds jn contract. 
Shelton confuses the contract of engagement of the attorney, which defines the scope of the 
duty owed, with the test for the breach of the duty, which is in to1t. In Harrigfeld, the scope of 
the attorney's engagement included duties to intended beneficiaries of a will, but did not define 
the breach. 140 Idaho at 138, 90 PJd at 888. In Johnson v. Jones, the court stated that ''The 
scope of an attorney's cono·actual duty to a client is defined by the purposes for which the 
attorney is retained." 103 Idaho at 704, 652 P.2d at 652. In Fuller v. Wolters, the court held 
"that an action for legal malpractice is a to11 action, and even thought the underlying transaction 
which resulted in the malpractice was a 'commercial transaction,' attorney fees under [Idaho 
Code §] 12-120(3) are not authorized." In short, the cases on which Shelton relies do not 
support her contract theory. 
87 
Jul.6.2010 11:15AM No. 8246 P. 7/12 
JI. THE DEATH OF PATRICIA SHELTON DESTROYS THE 
REQUIRE:MENT OF AN ATIORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND ANY 
STANDING TO MAINTAJN AN ACTION FOR PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
Shelton misreads the defendants' position. The defendants have no attorney-client 
relationship with Lois M. Bishop or Shelton's estate. Except as set out in Harrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004) a direct attorney-client relationship is required 
to exist between the plaintiff and attorney-defendant to support a legal malpractice action. 
The defendants never had an attorney-client relationship with Lois M. Bishop. Thus, 
defendant Owens did not owe a duty to Lois M. Bishop, Patricia Shelton's estate, or her 
heirs. As a matter of law, Lois M. Bishop does not have standing to bring a professional 
negligence claim against Owens. See Harrigfeld. 
ill. ECONOMIC LOSS RULE PROHIBITS RECOVERY 
Again, Shelton misreads the defendants' argument. Economic loss is not recoverable 
in tort unless a special relationship or other exception exists. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002J 1007-1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-1201 (1994). Lois 
Bishop and the estate of Shelton are not parties to the attorney-client relationship with the 
defendants. Therefore they do not qualify for the special relationship exception to the 
economic loss rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons no genuine issue of material fact exists. Defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this t:... day ofJuly, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, L 
BY.~-----------
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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of Idaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and ) 
.JEFFERY J. CRANDALL, individually, ) 
and in their capacities as Principals, ) 
manager agents, partners, ) 
representatives and employees of ) 
· OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, ) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-09-3597 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
SUBSTITUTE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
Plaintiff retained Defendants to represent her in a ,medical 
malpractice claim. The Idaho State Insurance Fund made a claim 
upon Plaintiff's recovery. In this case, Plaintiff alleges causes of 
action for negligence and breach of contract against Defendants. 
Defendants filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Joseph Jarzabek and Douglas B. Marks, ELSAESSER JARZABEK 
ANDERSON MARKS ELLIOTT & MACDONALD, attorneys for 
Plaintiff. 
Michael E. Ramsden, RAMSDEN & LYONS, attorneys for 
Defendants. 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of this case are set forth in this Court's "Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment," issued May 13, 2010, and "Memorandum Opinion and Order 
Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," issued on June 10, 2010. 1 The 
pertinent facts for purposes of this opinion and order are that the Plaintiff passed away 
on November 10, 2009, and notified the Defendants of the event on April 22, 2010, by 
serving an untiled copy of "Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as Personal 
Representative." 
The Defendants filed "Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment" on 
May 6, 2010, supported by the Affidavit of Michael Ramsden. The Plaintiff filed 
"Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as Personal Representative of Patricia J. 
Shelton" May 10, 2010. The Plaintiff also filed "Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment" on June 28, 2010. The Defendants replied on 
July 6, 2010. 
II 
STANDARDSFORSUMMARYJUDGMENT 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment where there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, based on the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
1 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. See Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which was filed on May 13, 2010. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
denied. See, Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, June 
10,2010. 
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with any a'ffidavits." Zumwalt v. Stephan, Balleisen & Slavin, 113 Idaho 822, 748 P.2d 
405 (Ct. App. 1987). 
In order to make that determination, the court must look to "the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any .... " (1.R.C.P. 
56.) Supporting and opposing affidavits must set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence. (I.R.C.P. 56.) Once the moving party has properly supported 
the motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must come forward with 
evidence which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party and which 
establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. Zehm v. Associated 
Logging Contractors, Inc., 116 Idaho 349,775 P.2d 1191 (1988). If the record contains 
conflicting inferences or if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a 
summary judgment must be denied. Roell v. City of Boise, 130 Idaho 197, 938 P.2d 
1237 (1997); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P .2d 876 (1991 ). 
The facts in the record are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing 
the motion. The opposing party cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials, but the 
party's response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact. (I.R.C.P. 56(e)); Smith v. Meridian Joint 
School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 918 P.2d 583 (1996); G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991 ); Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 
Idaho 851, 727 P.2d 1279 (Ct.App. 1986). 
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I. DISCUSSION 
A. Negligence Claim 
The Plaintiff has alleged negligence in her complaint. The elements for a claim 
for professional. negligence or legal malpractice are: (1) the existence of an attorney-
client relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the failure to 
perform that duty; and (4) the failure to perform that duty is the proximate cause of 
damages suffered by the client. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 
146 Idaho 311, 193 P .3d 858 (2008). 
In "Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Second Motion"), the 
Defendants assert that the Plaintiff's claims abated upon her death because her claim is 
a tort claim and at the time the Plaintiff instituted this action and at the time of her death 
Idaho did not have a statute of general survivability. 2 Thus, Defendants' present a 
common law issue of ex contractu (based in contract) verses ex delicto (based in tort) in 
the context of a legal malpractice claim. At common law, cases based in contract 
survive the death of the plaintiff, and cases in tort do not. Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 
415,814 P. 477 (1919) 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim, as alleged in 
her complaint, is a tort claim that would benefit her only personally. Defendants rely 
heavily on Idaho cases holding that in cases of personal injury, if the victim died before 
she recovered a judgment, then the victim's right of action also died. Evans v. Twin 
Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990); Craig v. Gellings, 148 Idaho 
192,219 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2009); Steele v. Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 
2 On July 1, 2010, Idaho Code § 5-327(b) came into effect, providing for general survivability of 
negligence claims. 
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136 P.3d 905 (2006); Doggett v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888, 477 
P.2d 511 (1970); Vulkv. Haley, 112 Idaho 855,736 P.2d 1309 (1987). However, each 
of these cases cited by the Defendants addresses medical malpractice or personal 
injury, not legal malpractice. 
Conversely, the Plaintiff argues that her legal malpractice claim a mixed claim of 
contract and tort, and therefore survives her death. In Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 
418, 814 P. 477, 480 (1919), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
[t]he true test is, not so much the form of the action, as the nature of the 
cause of action. Where the latter is a tort unconnected with contract, and 
which affects the person only, and not the estate, such as assault, libel, 
slander, and the like, there the rule, Actio persona/is, etc., applies. But 
where, as in the present case, the action is founded on a contract, it is 
virtually ex contractu, although nominally in tort, and there it survives. 
(citations omitted; emphasis added.) In that case, the plaintiff contracted with the 
defendant to purchase sodium arsenite, but the defendant provided sodium arsenate. 
When the plaintiff applied the sodium arsenate to his crops, the crops were destroyed. 
During the litigation, the plaintiff died. The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
"the injury for which recovery is sought grows out of the contract of 
purchase ... These facts distinguish this case from those where recovery 
is sought for injury to the person or for torts resulting in damage to the 
estate, generally, and make these claims assignable and cause them to 
survive the death of a party to the action." 
Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at418-419, 814 P. at480-481 (1919). 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed as similar question in Johnson v. Jones, 
103 Idaho 702, 704, 652 P .2d 650, 652 (1982), concluding that "legal malpractice 
actions are an amalgam of tort and contract theories." (citing Neel v. Magana, et. al, 6 
Cal.3d 176, 491 P.2d 421 (1971) and Higa v. Mirikitani, 155 Haw. 167, 517 P.2d 1 
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(1973).) The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the "tort basis" for a legal 
malpractice claim are the elements of an attorney-client relationship, failure to perform 
the duty owed, and negligence that is the proximate cause of the alleged injury. 
Johnson, 103 Idaho at 706-707. However, the Court noted that the attorney's duty is 
contractual and the scope of that duty is defined by the purposes for which the attorney 
is retained . .!.9.. at 704. 
Like Kloepfer, the Plaintiff's negligence claim arises out of the contract between 
the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The Plaintiff entered into an attorney-client relationship 
.. and fee agreement with the Defendants to represent her in settling her claims against 
the Idaho State Insurance Fund ("ISIF") and the North Idaho Advanced Care hospital 
("NIACH"). From this contract arose the duty to use the degree of care, skill, diligence 
and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful, and 
prudent attorney to represent the Plaintiff, inform her of the law, and provide her with 
accurate advice in settling her claims. See Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt. 
Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1, 981 P.2d 236 (1999). The Plaintiff claims that the 
Defendants breached the duty when they failed to obtain a subrogation settlement and 
properly advise her of the effect of the ISIF subrogation claim, and as a result, the 
Plaintiff did not receive the amount "promised" by the Defendants. 
B. Breach of Contract Claim 
The Plaintiff also alleged a second cause of action in her complaint: breach of 
contract. To be successful on her claim, the Plaintiff must prove that 1) a contract 
existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendants; 2) the Defendant's breached the 
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contract, and 3) the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach. Samuel v. 
Hepworth. Nungster & Lezamiz. Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000). 
The Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's 
breach of contract claim, arguing that the Plaintiff failed to state a claim. Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that if a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is 
presented with "matters outside the pleading ... the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." Because the Defendants 
desire to present this Court with affidavits and other evidence, the Defendants' motion is 
a motion for summary judgment, subject to the standard of I.R.C.P. 56. 
The Defendants argued that, 
[a]gainst an attorney, the sole cause of action is in tort and not contract. 
Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412,413 16 P.2d 661, 662 (1932). A claim 
for breach of contract does not state a claim where a claim for malpractice 
exits. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 350, 33 P.3d 
816, 824 (2001); Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 p.2d 661, 662 
(1932). 
Plaintiff did not respond regarding this issue, and this Court did not make a ruling on this 
issue in its "Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment," issued May 13, 
2010. In light of the issue raised by the Defendants in the Second Motion, this Court 
clarifies its "Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment." 
The Trimming decision cited by the Defendants addressed the tolling of a statute 
of limitations for a medical malpractice claim and has since been limited by Johnson v. 
Gorton, 94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d 1 (1972). In that case, the plaintiff brought a medical 
malpractice claim against a doctor. The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
[t]he gist of a malpractise (sic) action is negligence, not a breach of the 
contract of employment Hall v. Steele, 193 Cal. 602, 226 P. 854; 
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Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60; Peters v. Howard, 206 Ill. 
App. 610,617. 
Trimming, 52 Idaho at 413, 16 P.2d at 662. The Defendants, then, misquote the 
Trimming decision. The Defendants' reliance on Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp. 
136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001) is also misplaced because that case also addresses 
contract based claims in medical malpractice cases. 
The Defendants do not cite to any case law or statute that prohibits the Plaintiff 
from asserting a breach of contract claim in addition to negligence in a legal malpractice 
case. Conversely, there are multiple legal malpractice cases where a plaintiff has 
alleged both negligence and breach of contract. See, e.g., Samuel v. Hepworth, 
Nungster & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000); J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. 
Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 193 P.3d 858 (2008); Lapham v. Stewart, 
137 Idaho 582, 51 P.3d 396 (2002). 
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the pleadings before this Court, 
this Court clarifies its "Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment," issued 
May 13, 2010, concludes that the Plaintiff has stated a claim for breach of contract, a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
this issue is hereby denied. 
C. Economic Loss Rule and Attorney-Client Relationship Claims 
The Defendants also assert that if the Plaintiff's negligence claim is abated upon 
the Plaintiff's death, then the Plaintiff cannot substitute a personal representative in this 
action because the Defendants did not have an attorney-client relationship with the 
potential substitute. However, because this Court has dete-rmined that the Plaintiff's 
claims are not abated by her death, this Court need not address this issue. 
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The Defendants also claim that the economic loss rule prevents the personal 
representative from recovering against the Defendants. Similarly, because this Court 
has determined that the Plaintiff's claims are not abated by her death, this Court need 
not address this issue. 
D. Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as Personal Representative 
of Patricia J. Shelton 
Plaintiff has moved to substitute Lois M. Bishop, the personal representative of 
the Plaintiff's estate, as the Plaintiff's personal representative of the Plaintiff in this case. 
In support, the Plaintiff has supplied copies of "Letters Testamentary" issued November 
10, 2009, by a magistrate in Bonner County showing that the Plaintiff's sister Lois M. 
Bishop is appointed as personal representative of the Plaintiff's estate. Based on the 
pleadings in this action and because the Plaintiff's claims are not abated by her death, it 
is appropriate that the personal representative of the Plaintiff's estate be substituted for 
the Plaintiff in this action. 
V 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants' 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby DENIED. It is 
further ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as Personal 
Representative of Patricia J. Shelton is GRANTED. 
DATED this 2 ]Sf-day of July, 201 O. ~~ I dJ::::_ 
John Patrick Luster 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
OPINION AND ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE was sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, sent by facsimile 
transmission, or sent by interoffice mail on t~ day of July, 2010, to the following: 
Joseph Jarzabek and Douglas B. Marks 
ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON MARKS ELLIOTT & MACDONALD 
P. 0. Box 1049 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
FAX: (208) 263-0759 
Michael E. Ramsden 
RAMSDEN & L VONS 
P. 0. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000 
FAX: (208) 664-5884 
Patricia Shelton v. R. Bruce Owens, et al., CV-09-003597 - 10 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael E. Ramsden, ISB #2368 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. BRUCE OWENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the 
marital community composed thereof; 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, a 
limited liability company operating in the 
State ofldaho; R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFREY J. CRANDALL, individually, 
and in their capacities as principals, 
manager, agents, partners, representatives 
and employees of OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Defendants. 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Third party plaintiff, 
VS. 
IDAHO ST ATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Third arty Defendant. 
Case No. CV 09-3597 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
APPEAL BY PERMISSION 
Defendants' motion pursuant to I.A.R. 12(b) for its order granting an appeal by 
pe1mission of this.Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Defendants' Second Motion for 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR tlRillrft~~!SION -1 ,; n n luu 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Personal Representative entered July 
21, 2010 (the Order) duly and regularly came before the Court for hearing on August 11, 2010 
at 3:00 p.m. The Court reviewed the defendants' submission and the Order and determined that 
questions presented by the Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment and the Order 
are NOT controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of 
opinion and in which an immediate appeal from the order or decree will materially advance the 
orderly resolution of this litigation. 
Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Appeal by Permission is DENIED. 
ti+'h DATED this-JL day of August, 2010. 
JOHN. P. LUSTER, District Judge 
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Elsaesser J arzabek Anderson Marks & 
Elliott, Chtd. 
P. 0. Box 1049 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Michael E. Ramsden 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
P. O.13ox 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF KOOTENAI 
IN THE MATTER OF THE MOTION FOR 
APPEAL BY PERMISSION, 
LOIS M. BISHOP, personal representative 
of PATRICIA J. SHELTON, deceased, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
VS. 
R. BRUCE OWENS and JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and the marital 
community composed thereof; OWENS & 
CRANDALL, PLLC, a limited liability 
company operating in the State ofldaho; R. 
BRUCE OWENS and JEFFREY J. 
CRANDALL, individually, and in their 
capacities as principals, manager, agents, 
partners, representatives and employees of 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, 
Third party plaintiff, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Third Defendant. 
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Supreme Court Case No. 37992-2010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Category: L4 
Fee $101.00 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGif~AL 
1n-:, 
I _,.:) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, LOIS M. BISHOP, personal 
representative of the estate of PATRICIA J. SHELTON, deceased; AND TO THE 
RESPONDENTS ATTORNEYS, ELSAESSER JARZABEK ANDERSON MARKS 
ELLIOTT & MACDONALD, Chtd, P.O. Box 1049, Sandpoint, ID 83864; AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, R. BRUCE OWENS, JANE DOE OWENS, 
OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC, and JEFFREY J. CRANDALL appeals against the above 
named Respondent, LOIS M. BISHOP, personal representative of PATRICIA J. SHELTON to 
the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Personal Representative 
entered in the above-entitled action on July 21, 2010, The Honorable John P. Luster presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule l 2(b) I.A.R. 
and the Supreme Court's Order Granting Motion for Appeal by Permission, dated October 19, 
2010. 
This is not an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A.R. 12.2. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants then intend 
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal are: 
(a) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that a legal malpractice action does 
not abate upon the plaintiffs death. 
(b) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that a plaintiff may assert both a 
legal malpractice and breach of contract action against a lawyer for the same conduct. 
1 'J4 
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(c) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the claim for malpractice 
asserted by the plaintiff's personal representative is not barred by the economic loss rule. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any part of the record or transcript. 
5. Transcript. 
(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellants request the preparation of a standard transcript in hard 
copy of the hearing on Defendants' Second Motion for Suinmary Judgment that was held on 
July 13, 2010 at 3:00 p.m. before The Honorable Judge Luster. 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R: 
(a) Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(b) Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(c) Affidavit of Michael E. Ramsden in Support of Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
( d) Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Lois M. Bishop as Personal 
Representative of Patricia J. Shelton; 
(e) Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
(f) Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Lois M. 
Bishop as Personal Representative of Patricia J. Shelton; 
(g) Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for 
S wnmary Judgment; 
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(h) Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Defendants' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Personal 
Representative, dated July 21, 2010; 
(i) Notice of Appeal. 
7. The appellant request no further documents, charts or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be sent to the Supreme Court at this time. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested at the address listed below in the Certificate of Service. 
(b) That the court reporter shall be paid her fee in full upon receipt of her invoice for 
preparation of the transcript for the hearing held on July 13, 2010, as requested above. 
(c) That the fee for the clerk's record shall be paid upon receipt of the Court's 
invoice. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this y_ day of November, 2010. 
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RAMSDEN & L ~;'IS, LLP 
BiJ,_flL 
Michael E. Ramsden, Of the Finn 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I hereby certify that on the .Y_ day of November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Joseph J arzabek ~S Mail 
Elsaesser Jarzabek Anderson Marks & __ Overnight Mail 
Elliott, Chtd. Hand Delivered 
P. 0. Box 1049 __ Facsimile (208) 263-0759 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
AnnMcManus 
Court Reporter 
Kootenai County District Court 
PO Box 9000 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-9000 
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__ Overnight Mail 
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Michael E. Ramsden 
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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
PATRICIA J. SHELTON, an 
individual; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. BRUCE OWENS AND JANE DOE 
OWENS, husband and wife and 
the marital community composed 
thereof; OWENS & CRANDALL, 
PLLC, a limited liability company 
Operating in the State of Idaho, 
R. BRUCE OWENS and 
JEFFERY J. CRANDALL, 
Individually, and in their capacities 
as principals, managers, agents, 
partners, representatives as employees 
of OWENS & CRANDALL, PLLC. 
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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause 
was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was 
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postage prepaid on the --t day 
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